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I. INTRODUCTION
In the last few years federalism has become the issue on which the
Supreme Court is most clearly divided, with a narrow five-to-four
majority strengthening the position of the states at the expense of the
federal government.' This was again the case at the end of its last term
in the decisions pertaining to state sovereign immunity.2 The majority
1. See Linda Greenhouse, High Court Faces Moment of Truth in Federalism
Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28, 1999, § 1, at 34. The cases are: United States v. Lopez, 514
U.S. 549 (1995); Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996); and Printz v. United
States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997). The majority consists of Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justices Kennedy, O'Connor, Scalia, and Thomas.
2. See Alden v. Maine, 119 S. Ct. 2240 (1999); College Say. Bank v. Florida
Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 119 S. Ct. 2219 (1999); Florida Prepaid
Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Say. Bank, 119 S. Ct. 2199 (1999). This
trend has continued. See Linda Greenhouse, Women Lose Right to Sue Attackers in
Federal Court, N.Y. TIMES, May 16,2000, at Al.
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and their dissenters clearly feel that federalism is not merely an abstract
concept but that there are fundamental and urgent questions rooted in it;
those in dissent are unyielding, with compromise apparently being
impossible. While Chief Justice Rehnquist predicted a more state-
friendly approach fifteen years ago,3 which seems to have transpired, it is
now the turn for more federally inclined Justices to predict that the
opinion of the Court will be fleeting.4 In the 1999-2000 term the tone
between the two sides hardened, conveying the impression that they
have little to say to each other.6 This Article attempts to find middle
ground in this debate by analyzing the fundamental questions of
federalism through the lens of democracy within federalism.
Democracy and federalism as the topic of an Article almost sounds
like no topic at all. Mildly put, it is not a precisely limited subject. The
books on either one of these subject matters alone could easily fill an
entire library. But democracy within federalism raises some very
specific questions. The first and most fundamental question is: From
where does democratic legitimacy under the United States Constitution
originate? If one asked that question on the street or in the halls of a
university, it would probably lead to an answer like: "From the people,
obviously." That person is likely to have a puzzled look on his or her
face, as if a rather weird question had been asked. The trouble is that, in
a federal system, there is more than one entity that could be referred to
as "the people." It could be the people of the several states as separate
entities, or the people of the United States as one single entity. To be
more precise, the question is: Who are "the people?" This exact question
was the central part of the decision in U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v.
Thornton, and the reactions to it, especially the dissent by Justice
Thomas, showed that this question struck a nerve.8 In addition, the
Court's decisions on state sovereign immunity at the end of its last term
have resulted in an impassioned debate about the reconfiguration of the
3. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 580 (1985)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
4. See Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2295 (Souter, J., dissenting).
5. See Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 120 S. Ct. 631 (2000).
6. See generally Linda Greenhouse, Supreme Court Shields States from Lawsuits
on Age Basis, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12, 2000, at Al (describing the path that the majority of
the Court is taking as a "march in the direction of states' rights").
7. 514 U.S. 779 (1995).
8. The dissent has been described as a manifesto, a reinstallation of the Articles
of Confederation, or as questioning the legacy of Reconstruction. See Robert F. Nagel,
The Term Limits Dissent: What Nerve, 38 ARE. L. REV. 843, 844 (1996).
balance between the authority of states and the federal government
One of the dissenters in these cases, Justice Stevens, even accused the
Court of resurrecting the Articles of Confederation."0 This reaction is
due to the link between these questions and the identity of the United
States. Either the United States has a state-based and state-centered
form of government drawing its legitimacy from the people of each
single state, or the national government is legitimized by the nation as a
whole. One might expect this fundamental question to have been
discussed and answered when the Constitution was created or later
interpreted, but more than two hundred years later still no consensus
exists. The second question, closely linked to the first, is: How are the
states represented at the national level? Not only is the mode of
representation part of the answer to the first question, it is also important
with regard to the stability of the system. Are the states in a position to
protect not only their interests but also their powers and their position
within the constitutional structure? Different answers to this second
question have played a prominent role in Supreme Court decisions about
federalism, and what is necessary to protect the federal structure."
These are by no means new questions. On the contrary, the conflict
between the two levels of government, state and federal, is a very old
one. The main battleground of this debate, however, has been over
states' rights and the protection of individual rights by federal courts.
As John Hart Ely observed, this is not where federalism hangs in the
balance. 2 He correctly points out what is becoming obvious in recent
Supreme Court decisions. For the existence of states as independent
entities, it is more important where legislative competence lies. 3 This
Article is concerned with the groundwork for a debate over the
distribution of legislative competence, because it attempts to describe
the structure in which these powers are allocated-the structure of
democracy within federalism.
As a starting point, an analysis of Supreme Court decisions will show:
(1) how much the Court struggled with the question of how to evaluate
the states' influence at the national level; and (2) how antagonistic the
9. See Linda Greenhouse, States Are Given New Legal Shield by Supreme Court,
N.Y. TaIES, June 24, 1999, atAl. Initial reactions have been mixed. Compare Anthony
Lewis, Editorial, The Supreme Power, N.Y. TIMEs, June 29, 1999, at A19 (attacking the
Court and calling the majority "a band of radical judicial activists" who are rewriting the
structure of the government without support in the text of the Constitution), with David
Ignatius, Back to the States, WASH. PosT, June 27, 1999, at B7 (approving the decisions
and interpreting them as a step toward a government "close to the people").
10. See Greenhouse, supra note 9, at Al.
11. See infra Parts Il.A.1-2.
12. See JOHN HART ELY, ON CONsTrrTUoNAL GROUND 33 (1996).
13. See id.
350
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positions of the Justices are concerning the source of democratic
legitimacy. This Article argues that both positions are too narrow.
Middle ground and some of the compromises that were made during the
Founding Era have been lost in that debate. This Article attempts to
define and defend that middle ground. Analyzing the federal structure of
government by looking at the democratic processes reveals the dual
foundation of this structure. Democratic legitimacy is derived from the
people of the states as distinct and equal political entities, and from the
people of the United States as a whole. To argue in favor of one or the
other as the only or primary source of legitimacy is to neglect a vital part
of the federal structure created by the Constitution. The changes which
have been made with regard to the representation of states at the national
level lead to the conclusion that the interests of the states as states, as
opposed to the interests of the people of the states, are not represented
sufficiently anymore. However, these changes do not alter the basic
structure of the sources of democratic legitimacy.
II. THE SUPREME COURT
This Part discusses cases that are concerned with the definition of
limits to the powers of either the federal government or the individual
states. In these decisions, the fundamentally different views of the
federal system become evident.
A. Political Process as a Safeguard for Federalism?
How the states are represented on the federal level became significant
in the conflict over the adequacy of democratic processes, and the
representation of state interests therein, as a procedural safeguard for
federalism. In other words, the Supreme Court discussed whether the
states can look after themselves. This debate evolved on the basis of the
post-New Deal Commerce Clause doctrine, which began with National
Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.4 and developed
into a "tradition of restraint" under which the Court "routinely rubber-
stamped" Congressional statutes without regard to how much or how
little they actually had to do with interstate commerce.'5 Nevertheless,
14. 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
15. Ann Althouse, Enforcing Federalism After United States v. Lopez, 38 ARIZ. L.
REV. 793,793 (1996).
the Supreme Court attempted to develop judicially enforceable limits in
National League of Cities v. Usery,"6 only to overrule this decision in
Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority.7 Different views
of the national democratic process were crucial in both cases. The
following section describes the different positions in these two cases and
examines the impact they had in some other, more recent cases.
1. National League of Cities v. Usery
In National League of Cities, the majority held that Congress cannot
regulate the "States as States,"'8 and therefore statutes interfering with
"traditional[]"' 9 or "integral"' governmental functions of the states are
unconstitutional. The main dissent, written by Justice Brennan, argued
that restraints on the plenary commerce power of Congress "lie in the
political process and not in the judicial process."2' In a separate dissent
based essentially on a similar view of the political processes, Justice
Stevens pointed to the political powers of those affected by the
legislation which was declared unconstitutional in order to demonstrate
that intervention by the Court was inappropriate.'
2. Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority
National League of Cities was overruled by Garcia after only nine
years. The majority embraced the basic argument of the dissent in
National League of Cities and elaborated on the concept of the political
process as a tool for the states to influence the federal government, thus
preventing enactment of laws that unduly burden them. According to
the Court in Garcia, the Framers believed that the federal structure of
government functions as a limit to the powers of Congress. As state
interests are represented in the national political process, the states can
protect their powers from the federal government without judicial
intervention.' The Court acknowledged that the structure has changed
since 1787 and mentioned the Seventeenth Amendment, but it was
convinced that the procedural restriction provided by the representation
of the states was still intact.2 Examples of how the political process
16. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
17. 469 U.S. 528, 531 (1985).
18. National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 845.
19. Id. at 851.
20. Id. at 852.
21. Id. at 857 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
22. See id. at 881 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
23. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 530-31 (1985).
24. See id. at 550.
25. See id. at 554.
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effectively protected the states were listed in the opinion of the Court.26
Left open was the possibility of extraordinary defects in the political
process, which could lead to the invalidation of congressional
regulation.' Denial of the right of participation in the national political
process and political isolation of a state are examples of such a
malfunction, as highlighted by the Court in South Carolina v. Baker.2
The dissent in Garcia criticized the majority's description of the
political process. Though members of Congress are elected in the
various states, the dissent regarded them as members of the federal
government as soon as they are in office. 9 The dissent conceded that the
political process could have worked as a safeguard at some point in
history. However, it emphasized political alterations such as the
growing influence of national media, and therefore the growing
significance of national issues, as well as changes in the constitutional
structure that limit state influence." In her separate dissent, Justice
O'Connor gave examples of the unprecedented growth of the federal
government in order to demonstrate the insufficiency of the political
process for the representation of state interests.3
3. New York v. United States
Garcia has not been overruled explicitly. However, either it has been
declared inapplicable or the Court has failed to mention it in cases where
the safeguard doctrine could have been relevant, raising doubts about the
validity of the decision. In New York v. United States,2 which declared
parts of a congressional statute unconstitutional, the Court distinguished
New York from Garcia on the basis that the former involved
congressional legislation applicable to private parties and states while
the latter was concerned with legislation applicable to states only.33
Justice White wrote for the dissent that this distinction is not tenable
since a state is not affected less if the restriction applies to private parties
as well.' According to the dissent, the Court could not have struck
26. See id. at 552-55.
27. See id. at 556.
28. 485 U.S. 505,512-13 (1988).
29. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 564-65 (Powell, J., dissenting).
30. See id. at 565 n.9 (Powell, J., dissenting).
31. See id. at 587-88 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
32. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
33. See id. at 160.
34. See id. at 202, 205 (White, J., dissenting in part).
down the statute under the process-based ruling of Garcia because, in
the case of New York, the political process had functioned nicely and the
states had been able to protect themselves. 5 Even if the distinction made
by the majority were tenable and Garcia itself were not applicable, the
basic notion expressed in Garcia, namely the reliance on a procedural
safeguard for federalism, could have been employed in New York. This
is because the states in New York were very involved in the creation of
the regulation that was struck down. 6 Considering these arguments, it
does appear that the New York ruling turns away from the concept of a
procedural safeguard.
4. United States v. Lopez
In United States v. Lopez,37 the Supreme Court, for the first time since
the New Deal, invalidated a statute based on the argument that it
exceeded Congress's power under the Commerce Clause." Garcia was
ignored by all the opinions. The majority emphasized that the federal
government is a government of enumerated and therefore limited
powers, and held that it is necessary for the Court to enforce these
limits.39 In the eyes of the Court, a refusal by the judiciary to enforce
these limits would be the authorization of a general federal police
power." In a concurring opinion, Justice Kennedy wrote that, as the
political process lacks the structural mechanisms to safeguard a balance
between the states and the federal government, the Court must
intervene. 4' As in Garcia, the role of the judiciary opposite Congress
was discussed, but the result was completely different. Instead of
accepting the idea of a procedural safeguard preventing Congress from
overstepping its powers and diminishing the role of the states, the Court
judged the outcome and tried to define what constitutes the overstepping
of congressional powers.4 2 It is surprising that not even the dissenters
mention Garcia, especially since two of the dissenting opinions
maintained that the Court should defer to Congress's superior ability to
make empirical judgment43 and its higher institutional competence.'
The dissent, like the majority in Garcia, argued that deference to
35. See id. at 206 (White, J., dissenting in part).
36. See id. (White, J., dissenting in part).
37. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
38. See id. at 551.
39. See id. at 566-68.
40. See id. at 564.
41. See id. at 578 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
42. See id. at 558-63.
43. See id. at 616-17 (Breyer, L, dissenting).
44. See id. at 604 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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congressional judgment is necessary, but only in Garcia was the
underlying reason faith in the political process. Most striking, however,
is that Justice Kennedy did not mention Garcia in his concurring
opinion, since his perception of the political branches as ill-equipped to
maintain the balance between nation and states is the exact opposite of
the ruling in that case.45 As not only the majority, but all of the Justices
ignored Garcia, the belief that the political process is a sufficient
safeguard for the balance in the federal system seems to have vanished,
even though only Justice Kennedy explicitly has said so.
5. Printz v. United States
In Printz v. United States,4 Garcia staged a comeback. The majority
held that Congress cannot compel state officers to implement a federal
program that intrudes on state autonomy' In this case, the dissent relied
on Garcia and the belief that the political system is the primary
safeguard for federalism established therein. Referring to Garcia, the
dissent claimed that when evaluating the effects of federal legislation on
the states, a congressional enactment is supported by a strong
presumption of validity." Two years after Garcia was ignored in New
York and Lopez, the notion of primarily procedural limits, based on the
effectiveness of the democratic processes, was again part of the debate.
6. Summary
The Court still struggles with the question of when to defer to
Congress and when to intervene. A significant part of that problem is
the lack of consensus concerning the structure of national democratic
processes. Either their structure allows them to function as an effective
safeguard for federalism, which would reduce the role of the Court to
that of a guardian of these processes, or the structure of these processes
does not provide state interests with sufficient influence on the federal
government. In the case of the latter, the Court must define limits for
the national institutions. The Court's evaluation of the structure of the
democratic processes on the national level is therefore crucial to the
decision of cases concerning the balance between the nation and the
45. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
46. 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
47. See id. at 933.
48. See id. at 956-57 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
states.
B. The Source of Democratic Legitimacy
In U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton,9 the Supreme Court invalidated
an amendment to the Arkansas Constitution. The majority held that
Congress is "a uniform national body representing the interests of a
single people.""0 Accordingly, the people of a single state cannot make a
decision regarding the qualifications for persons representing that single
national people." In his concurring opinion, Justice Kennedy wrote that
the people as a whole legitimize the national government.52 He then
emphasized the two political identities of United States citizens:
In one sense it is true that 'the people of each State retained their separate
political identities,' for the Constitution takes care both to preserve the States
and to make use of their identities and structures at various points in organizing
the federal union. It does not at all follow from this that the sole political
identity of an American is with the State of his or her residence. It denies the
dual character of the Federal Government which is its very foundation to assert
that the people of the United States do not have a political identity as well, one
independent of, though consistent with, their identity as citizens of the State of
their residence.53
Both opinions maintained that the legitimacy of the federal government
is not derived from the states or the people of the states, but from a
single people with an identity of its own-the people of the United
States. In contrast, the dissent claimed that the authority of the
Constitution is ultimately based upon the people of each individual state
and not on a single national people.'M This raises the stakes considerably
since not only the legitimacy of the federal government is debated, but
also a more fundamental debate comes into view. This is a debate about
the legitimacy of the Constitution itself. In accordance with its view on
the source of constituent power, the dissent portrayed Congress as
representing the people of each state and not the people of the nation."
These two radically different opinions discuss a more fundamental
problem than the cases mentioned above. It is a debate not only
concerning the political process within a federal system, but also about
the foundation of this federal system. Is the Constitution's power reliant
on each state and the people thereof as a separate entity, or is it to be
49. 514 U.S. 779 (1995).
50. Id. at 822.
51. See id. at 821-22 & n.32.
52. See id. at 839 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
53. Id. at 840 (quoting Thomas, J., dissenting) (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
54. See id. at 846 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
55. See id. at 858-59 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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found in the people of the United States as a whole, in the American
people?
1H. THE CONSTITUTION IN THE BEGINNING
The recent struggle for a new jurisprudence of federalism in which the
conflicts about democracy became apparent has been a "campaign of
history."56  More often than not, the analysis of this history, of the
intentions of the Framers as well as of the ratifying conventions in the
states, proves to be conflicting. Because this discussion focuses heavily
on the history of the Constitution, one should start with the Founding. In
addition, beginning with an analysis of early constitutional history
creates a foundation on which the study of subsequent development can
be based and a background against which the changes of the
constitutional structure can be highlighted. The Court struggles with the
evaluation of the national democratic processes; there is fundamental
disagreement concerning the source of democratic legitimacy. This
Article shows that the opposing views concerning the latter do not
reflect all aspects of the Constitution but omit a crucial feature of its
creation and of its development: compromise. The process of creating
and amending the Constitution established a middle ground, which is
lacking in the opinions of the Justices. With regard to the safeguard
doctrine, the Court fails to distinguish between the states and the state
governments, and therefore fails to see the important changes since the
Founding that made the safeguard doctrine untenable.
Historians and legal scholars agree that, under the Constitution of
1787, it is the people that are sovereign and not the states or the federal
government.57 However, it is highly contested whether the people of the
56. Harry N. Scheiber, Redesigning the Architecture of Federalism-An American
Tradition: Modem Devolution Policies in Perspective, 14 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 227,
295 (1996). This is also true for the latest decisions about state sovereign immunity,
most clearly in Alden v. Maine, 119 S. Ct. 2240 (1999), where the Justices present very
different versions of history.
57. See THORNTON ANDERSON, CREATING THE CONSTITUTION: THE CONVENTION OF
1787 AND THE FIRST CONGRESS 13 (1993); RAOUL BERGER, FEDERALISM: THE
FouNDERs' DESIGN 44 (1987); MARTIN H. REDISH, THE CONSlTrION AS POLITICAL
STRUCTuRE 32 (1995); GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC,
1776-1787, at 530 (1969); Michael P. Zuckert, A System Without Precedent: Federalism
in the American Constitution, in THE FRAMING AND RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION
132, 149 (Leonard W. Levy & Dennis J. Mahoney eds., 1987); see also Akhil Reed
Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425, 1451-52 (1987) (quoting
nationalists as well as states' rights advocates).
states separately or the American people constitute this sovereignty.
Since the constitutional text does not explicitly declare one or the other
to be the source of its legitimacy, further examination is necessary. This
Article focuses on representation in the new governmental structure
within the context of the general development of the document during
the Philadelphia Convention. The Constitutional Convention approved
the Constitution unanimously58 and ratification of the Constitution took
place in popularly elected state conventions." This Article initially looks
at the Constitution as it was approved by the Convention in Philadelphia
and ratified in the state conventions, and then examines the Bill of
Rights.
A. The Convention's Constitution
In the 1780s, disillusionment with American politics grew despite
attempts to reform state constitutions.6°  By 1786, the political
atmosphere was increasingly receptive to a reform of some sort;
6'
dissatisfaction with the political system in the states was growing, 62 and
the shortcomings of the state governments resulted in hostility of
nationalists 6 toward them.6 As a result of that growing sentiment, the
Annapolis Convention met in September 1786 with the goal of
considering a common interstate policy regarding commerce with only
five of the thirteen states present.' The nationalists, most notably
Alexander Hamilton and James Madison, used the occasion to call for
another convention in 1787, which was endorsed by a reluctant Congress
only after all states apart from Rhode Island had approved.6 The
58. See 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 641 (Max
Farrand ed., 1911) [hereinafter RECORDs].
59. See DAVID E. KYVIG, EXPLICIT AND AUTHENTIC AcTs: AMENDING THE U.S.
CONSTrrurION, 1776-1995, at 69-85 (1996) (providing an account of the ratification
process).
60. See WOOD, supra note 57, at 463.
61. See GORDON S. WOOD, THE MAKING OF THE CONSTrrUTON 13-14 (1987).
62. See id. at 14-18.
63. The terms "nationalists" and "states' righters" will be used to characterize two
groups with opposing positions during the Convention. When the Articles of
Confederation were discussed, these two positions already existed, although not as
organized groups. Of course, these are generalizations, but they serve to illustrate the
basic conflicts in the Convention.
64. See WOOD, supra note 61, at 15 (noting that Madison's paper about the vices
of the political system of the United States, written in the winter of 1786-1787, was
concerned mostly with the deficiencies of state governments); id. at 19 (quoting Henry
Knox, who urged Rufus King to "smite" the state governments); Amar, supra note 57, at
1440 (quoting Madison).
65. See Bruce Ackerman & Neal Katyal, Our Unconventional Founding, 62 U.
CHi. L. REv. 475,494-96 (1995).
66. See 1 ALFRED H. KELLY ET AL., THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION: ITS ORIGINS
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congressional endorsement stated that the "purpose" of the Convention
should be "revising the Articles of Confederation." 67 In 1787, most
Americans, including states' rights defenders, saw the necessity of
giving Congress additional powers; the strengthening of the national
government was agreed upon.6
In that climate favorable to change, each state legislature selected
delegates for the Convention. The majority of the delegates saw
themselves as representatives of their respective states; one delegation
had instructions prohibiting it from changing equal representation of the
states in Congress.69 However, a few delegates considered themselves
representatives of America or of the American people as a whole.'0
Though the interests of the states strongly influenced the delegates'
perspectives, they did not always determine them, as demonstrated by
the regularly occurring divisions within state delegations.7 According to
the rules of the Convention, each state's delegation had one vote, and a
minimum of seven states had to be present to do business. 2
Clearly, the starting point for the concrete development of a new
constitutional text was composed of different conflicting elements. The
national government was to be strengthened, but the nationalists wanted
much more, while the reluctant state legislatures selected the delegates
and gave instructions in order to protect their powers. The situation at
the outset of the Convention suggested that a compromise of some sort
was the most likely outcome.
The following sections will focus on the provisions of the Constitution
concerning two democratic processes: (1) the election of Congress and
the President, and (2) the procedures for ratifying and amending the
AND DEVELOPMENT 87-88 (7th ed. 1991); Leonard W. Levy, Constitutional History,
1776-1789, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 376, 382 (Leonard W.
Levy et al. eds., 1986).
67. 32 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 1774-1789, at 71-72 (Roscoe R.
Hill ed., 1936).
68. See M.E. BRADFORD, ORIGINAL INTENTIONS: ON THE MAKING AND
RATIFICATION OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 34 (1993); DAAN BRAVEmAN Fr AL.,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: STRUCTURE AND RIGHTS IN OUR FEDERAL SYSTEM 4 (3d ed.
1996); WOOD, supra note 57, at 471; Levy, supra note 66, at 382 (quoting defendants of
states' rights conceding the ineptness of the national government and the need for
change).
69. See 1 RECORDS, supra note 58, at4.
70. See FORREST McDONALD, Novus ORDO SECLORUM: INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF
THE CONSTITUTION 185 (1985).
71. See ANDERSON, supra note 57, at 43.
72. See 1 RECORDS, supra note 58, at 8.
Constitution. A careful analysis will provide answers to the following
questions: First, what is the source of democratic legitimacy according
to the Constitution? Second, what role do the people of the states and
state institutions play in these processes?
1. The Text
The Preamble states: "We the People of the United States... do
ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of
America." Grammatically, this may either describe the one people of
the United States, or refer to the inhabitants in a less specific way. The
latter interpretation does not make a distinction between the people of
the states and the American people, but refers only to the people in
general. In this understanding, the Preamble simply announces that the
constituent power is no longer in the hands of a monarch, but in the
hands of the people. The difference, however, from the preamble of the
Articles of Confederation, with its reference to each state, is striking.4
This could be an argument for a nationalist interpretation, concluding
that the constituent power is derived from the one people of the United
States. Yet the Preamble crept into the document late during the
Convention. On September 10, 1787, a draft of the Constitution was
referred to the Committee of Style; the Preamble read: "We the People
of the States of New-Hampshire [and the other states] do ordain, declare
and establish the following Constitution for the Government of
Ourselves and our Posterity." 5 The version reported to the Convention
by the Committee on September 12 was the vastly different final text, as
quoted above.76 No debates about this change in the Committee are
reported and no remark regarding it was made in the Convention.7 This
lack of debate is quite surprising, as the change from "We the People of
the States," including the enumeration of all states, to "We the People of
the United States," and the omission of the enumeration of the states,
73. U.S. CONST. preamble.
74. In the Preamble of the Articles of Confederation, those signing the document
describe themselves as "Delegates of the States." An explicit reference to "the peoples"
in the plural is made in article 1 of the Treaty on European Union, which speaks of an
"ever closer union among the peoples of Europe." J.H.H. WEtLER, THE CoNSTnTUnON
OF EuRoPE 327 (1999) (emphasis omitted). This phrase has been one of Europe's
articles of faith. See id. at 344-48 (discussing different views of multiple demot).
75. 2 RECORDS, supra note 58, at 565.
76. See 2 id. at 590.
77. See Henry Paul Monaghan, We the Peopleis], Original Understanding, and
Constitutional Amendment, 96 CoLuM. L. REv. 121, 166 (1996) (quoting Max Farrand,
who suggests the practical explanation that enumeration of the states was impossible
because nobody could know which states would ratify).
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changes the meaning drastically. Indeed, the indifference of the
Convention toward this alteration suggests that the change was not
intended to be that significant, but only considered a stylistic change.
Whatever the motive for the change, the Preamble in itself does not
provide conclusive evidence for a nationalist or state-centered reading of
the Constitution."
a. Amendment Process/Ratification
In Article V, the possibility of amending the Constitution is made
dependent upon the assent of three-fourths of the states; the amendments
can be ratified either by the state legislatures or by conventions in the
states 9 Congress can propose amendments, but the process can also be
initiated by two-thirds of the state legislatures.0 Not only does the
validity of an amendment depend upon the assent of institutions in a
majority of the states, but it can also take place without Congress or any
other national organ initiating it.' If the state legislatures initiate the
amendment process, Congress calls a national convention to propose
amendments.82 This guarantees a national forum to debate constitutional
amendment, even if Congress does not debate the proposals prior to
calling a convention. As a result, there is always a national institution
involved in the process, either initiating or deciding on the amendments.
Furthermore, as unanimity is no longer required to amend the
Constitution, the power of a single state to veto changes in the law,
which will then bind it, is abolished; by comparison, each state did have
this power under the Articles of Confederation.
3
Similarly, according to Article VII, the Constitution is established as
soon as it is ratified by popularly elected conventions in nine states.'
This abandoned the unanimity rule concerning not only the amendment
but also the establishment of the Constitution. Moreover, in two ways it
gave the Constitution a new kind of legitimacy. In contrast to the
78. See Amar, supra note 57, at 1450 (emphasizing the importance of taking the
whole document into account instead of just relying on the Preamble, although he
concludes that the whole Constitution unequivocally supports the unitary people thesis).




83. The Articles of Confederation could only be amended with the assent of all
state legislatures. See BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 41 (1991).
84. See U.S. CONST. art. VII.
Articles of Confederation, neither state governments nor other existing
state institutions decided upon the adoption of the document.5 In
addition, the appeal to the people to elect conventions for the sole
purpose of ratifying the Constitution provided a more direct democratic
basis for the national constitution than most of the state constitutions
had. The constitutions of the states were drafted and adopted in
provincial congresses that were generally considered extraordinary
political bodies,86 but most of them also assumed the powers of
"ordinary" legislatures." Only in New Hampshire and Massachusetts
were the constitutions adopted through popular ratification rather than
by the conventions that drafted them.88 However, the majority necessary
to put the document into effect was not a majority of the people of the
United States, but a majority of state conventions, each having one vote.
The rejection of unanimity and of ratification by state legislatures
leads at least one scholar to the conclusion that the Preamble refers to
the whole people of the United States as the locus of constituent power.9
In order to draw this conclusion, one must make the assumption that if a
power is not exclusively in the hands of the states, it is in the hands of
the American people. The possibility of something in between, of a
combination of some sort, is neglected. The ratification and the
amendment processes establish essentially similar procedures. Denying
a single state the power to prevent the validation of the Constitution or
of a constitutional amendment clearly subordinates the people of each
state to something larger. This larger entity, however, is not the people
of the United States, as a one-state convention/one-vote rule is
employed. The deciding entity consists of a majority of the peoples of
the states, with each people having one vote through its convention or
legislature. Thus, the Constitution is not based on each people of each
state, nor is it founded on a consolidated American people.
b. Congress
In Article I, the Constitution deals with the election and powers of
85. See id.
86. See MARK W. KRuMAN, BETWEEN AUTHORITY AND LmERTY: STATE
CONSTITUTION MAKING IN REVOLUTONARY AmERICA 24 (1997).
87. See id. at 15-33 (giving an account of constitution making in the states, arguing
that the revolutionary situation made it necessary for the conventions to perform ordinary
legislative functions but that there was a distinction between the constituent and the
legislative power).
88. See id. at 33.
89. See SAmuEL H. BEER, To MAKE A NATION: THE REDISCOVERY OF AMERICAN
FEDERALISM 335-36 (1993); Robert N. Clinton, A Brief History of the Adoption of the
United States Constitution, 75 IOWA L. REV. 891, 909 (1990).
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both branches of the bicameral Congress. The members of the House of
Representatives are to be chosen by the "People of the several States."90
This language is a remarkable change from the Preamble in that the
former refers to the several states in the plural, and to their respective
peoples as electing the members of the House. 1 Adding to this state-
based form of election is the fact that the qualifications for electors were
the same as for each corresponding state legislature;' the qualifications
were not set at the national level, thus allowing for different rules in
every state. But section 2 of Article I goes on to apportion the
representatives according to the number of inhabitants of each state,
thereby providing for popular representation in the House, as opposed to
representation of the states. 3 Therefore, the House does not represent
the people of the states based on the notion that they are equals and have
equal voting power, but according to the size of their population. This
creates an institution based on the population of the United States as a
whole and representing the whole people of the United States. Because
each state is guaranteed at least one representative regardless of the size
of its population,94 this system is not one of pure popular representation.
Nevertheless, the House of Representatives, as a body based on the
population of the nation, has a distinctly national character. However,
due to the reference to the people of the states as those electing its
members, there are still strong traces of the states as relevant entities.
The second branch of Congress, the Senate, consists of two Senators
from each state. The Senators were to be elected by the legislature of
the state they represented; 95 the Senate was therefore the counterpart of
the House, providing equal representation for every state. The
Entrenchment Clause in Article V, guaranteeing equal representation of
the states in the Senate, illustrates the emphasis that was placed on the
equality of the states in at least one branch of the national legislature.96
In contrast, the fact that Senators and Representatives are paid out of the
Treasury of the United States' indicates that, although Senators
represent the states, an allegiance with and responsibility toward the
90. U.S. CONST. arL I, § 2, cl. 1.
91. See U.S. CONST. preamble.
92. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1.
93. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2.
94. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3.
95. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 1.
96. See U.S. CONsT. art. V.
97. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, el. 1.
nation exist.
Overall, Congress represents three different groups. The population of
the nation is represented in the House, by popular representation. The
minimum of one representative per state and the state-based election
process ensure the relevance of the people of each state. The state
governments are represented in the Senate, which thus indirectly
represents the people of each state, and also guarantees the
representation of the governmental bureaucracy. Compared with the
Continental Congress created by the Articles of Confederation, not only
did the national legislature gain powers, but the election process was
nationalized as well. Although the state governments lost much of the
control they had over the national legislature under the Articles of
Confederation, they nevertheless retained a substantial amount of that
control through their representation in the Senate.
c. The President
No distinct national executive power existed under the Articles of
Confederation. In contrast, the Constitution created the office of
President of the United States, vesting all the executive power in this
office." The electors, who form the Electoral College and choose the
President, are apointed in each state according to rules set up by the
state legislature, thereby forming the state-centered part of the process.
Each state appoints as many electors as it has representatives in
Congress, thereby incorporating popular representation into the process
of presidential selection. If no candidate achieves the necessary majority
in the Electoral College, the House of Representatives decides by
selecting among the two candidates who received the most votes.'" In
making this decision, each delegation from each state has one vote.
Thus, the process of electing the President incorporates the influence of
the states through the control that state legislatures have over the
election of the electors; this process also has a national basis due to the
apportioning of the delegates. In principle, this resembles the way that
Congress is elected, although the similar result is achieved by different
means. In both cases, relevant national and state components exist.
d. Conclusion
The Constitution reflected different priorities. The bicameral
Congress incorporated a branch based on popular representation and a
98. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, C1. 1.
99. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1, ci. 2.
100. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 3.
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branch based on equal representation of the states. The role of the state
governments is noteworthy. They had substantial influence on the
national government, based on representatives chosen by them, which
gave a voice to those who would lose power if the nation were to
diminish the role of the states. This, arguably, enables the states to
protect themselves. The process of electing the President incorporates
popular representation and a strong influence of the states. Ratification
and amendment processes create an entity with constituent power that is
situated "in between" the people of each state and the people of the
United States. This entity is composed of the people of the states as
separate political units and the unitary American people; each part of
that entity is unable to use its share of the constituent power without the
consent of the other component. Using these various and sophisticated
ways of creating and securing a balance between nation and states, the
Constitution relies on two pillars as its foundation. Legitimacy for the
Constitution itself and for the national institutions is derived neither
solely from the people as a whole nor solely from the people of each
state individually, but rather from both.'°
2. The Development of the Text
The nationalists eventually persuaded the convention to right things
they perceived to be wrong in the Articles of Confederation. All
delegates accepted the necessity of change, none openly advocated
preserving the status quo,'O° and the nationalists entered the Convention
with strong beliefs and a definite objective that they wanted to achieve. 3
Several nationalist delegates, among them James Madison, James
Wilson, and Rufus King, did not want any recognition of state
sovereignty in the Constitution, reducing the state governments to "mere
101. See Douglas G. Smith, An Analysis of Two Federal Structures: The Articles of
Confederation and the Constitution, 34 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 249 (1997). Smith views the
Constitution as a social compact with the states and the people as parties, but without
specifying whether the people are the American people or the peoples of the states; if
there are specifications they are contradictory, speaking of both the people of the several
states and the people of the United States as the sources of authority for the national
government. See id. at 292-93.
102. See McDONALD, supra note 70, at 213.
103. See WOOD, supra note 57, at 474-75; see also JACK N. RAKOVE, OIGINAL
MEANINGS: POLrrCS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF ThE CONsTrruTION 46-56 (1996)
(giving a longer description of Madison's preparation and the development of his ideas).
'planets' orbiting the federal 'sun.""' Madison was the first to arrive in
Philadelphia and was better prepared than anyone else.'" In contrast, the
nationalists' opponents faced the difficulty of wanting to strengthen the
central government without compromising the sovereignty that the states
possessed."°
Presenting the Virginia Plan at the beginning of the Convention,
Edmund Randolph openly discussed a "consolidated union, in which the
idea of states should be nearly annihilated."'O° Though the Virginia Plan
had provisions guaranteeing that the states would continue to exist in
some way, 0' it would have created a supreme national government."
The best example for this is resolution 6 of the Virginia Plan,
empowering Congress to negate all state laws "contravening in the
opinion of the National Legislature the articles of Union."" With their
proposal, the nationalists set the stage for the debates.' and, at least in
the beginning, dominated its dynamics.
a. Amendment Process/Ratification
The Virginia Plan's initial provision regarding amendments was brief.
It simply stated that an amendment provision was necessary and that the
assent of the national legislature should not be a requirement."2 The
New Jersey Plan, introduced as an alternative to the Virginia Plan on
June 15, 1787,"' did not contain an amending provision."4 Serious
104. Stephen R. McAllister, Is There a Judicially Enforceable Limit to
Congressional Power Under the Commerce Clause?, 44 U. KAN. L. REv. 217, 221
(1996).
105. See WooD, supra note 57, at 472-73 (including an account of how Madison
started to prepare in the winter of 1785-1786).
106. See H. Jefferson Powell, The Oldest Question of Constitutional Law, 79 VA. L.
REv. 633, 654 (1993).
107. 1 RECORDS, supra note 58, at 24 (emphasis omitted). Randolph is quoted only
by Yates, but there is support for this view in other remarks by Randolph. See
ANDERSON, supra note 57, at 51.
108. See ANDERSON, supra note 57, at 52.
109. See WOOD, supra note 57, at 525.
110. 1 RECORDS, supra note 58, at 21.
111. See BRADFORD, supra note 68, at 4 (emphasizing the importance of having a
substantive motion accepted for discussion at the beginning of any meeting of this kind).
112. See I RECORDS, supra note 58, at 22 (Res. 13).
113. See id. at 242-45.
114. See JOHN R. VILE, THE CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDING PROCESS IN AMERICAN
POLITICAL THOUGHT 28 (1992) (discussing whether the drafters of the New Jersey Plan
considered amendment unnecessary or expected the relevant provisions of the Articles of
Confederation to remain in place). The omission of an amendment provision in the New
Jersey plan seems to support the contention that its drafters intended that the existing
amendment provisions would remain, but the rejection of the New Jersey Plan
diminishes the relevance of this question.
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debate on this issue occurred only in the last week of the Convention."5
The Committee of Detail then proposed that the national legislature
should call a national convention to amend the Constitution upon the
application of two-thirds of the state legislatures. 116 This proposal was
passed unanimously on August 30 and almost no debate was recorded.'
It then was opened for reconsideration on September 10, and was altered
drastically. Amendments now are binding only when three-fourths of
the states assent, whereas previously a national convention could decide
alone.' On September 15, motions to require ratification by all the
states, to add a provision protecting the internal police of the states, and
to throw out the amendment article altogether failed. The Entrenchment
Clause and the option for the states to call for a national convention
found a majority." 9 As a result of the changes made during the first two
weeks of September, the amendment process agreed upon in the end was
vastly different from the one that was passed unanimously on August 30.
The procedure first started with proposals by the states, with the final
decision regarding the proposed amendments in the hands of a national
convention. It resulted in a procedure beginning with proposals by
Congress and ending with ratification by the states. This reduced the
role of national institutions significantly. No proposal tried to establish
a national referendum, or tried to ensure that a number of states
containing a majority of the population of the United States would be
sufficient to amend the Constitution.20 If the constituent power was a
power of the one people of the United States, as the Preamble is read by
some, it is significant that the power to amend the Constitution was not
vested in them.' The irrelevance of the people of the United States as a
whole for this process-their significance was not even suggested during
the debates-is at odds with a nationalist interpretation of the Preamble,
which locates the constituent power solely in that one people.'
115. See ANDERSON, supra note 57, at 161.
116. See 2 RECORDS, supra note 58, at 174, 188.
117. See 2 id. at 467-68.
118. See id. at 557-59.
119. See id. at629-31.
120. See ANDERSON, supra note 57, at 158.
121. The dangers of democratic despotism were on the minds of all enlightened
thinkers of the time. See BERNARD BAiLYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE
AMERICAN REVOLUTION 282-83 (1967).
122. See ANDERSON, supra note 57, at 160 (concluding that a single national body
politic in charge of amending the Constitution was not even debatable at the end of the
Convention).
According to the Virginia Plan, the ratification of the Constitution was
to take place in assemblies or one national assembly elected by the
people in each state after the approbation of Congress.' z  The clause
making the approbation of Congress necessary was removed without any
debate,": and a proposal to reinsert it was rejected on September 10."
The delegates were very concerned with avoiding obstacles that might
prevent ratification of their work. The motions requiring unanimity or
the approbation of Congress were easily defeated by a ten-to-one vote;
most of the speakers pointed to the negative effect on the likelihood of
ratification.12'6  Requiring ratification in conventions elected for that
purpose was a tool not only to achieve a more direct democratic
legitimacy but also to circumvent the state legislatures.Y Since they
were to lose a considerable amount of their power, they were thought of
as reluctant ratifiers." Randolph's motion to have a second convention
debate and ratify the Constitution was unanimously rejected because this
would have meant that everything the Philadelphia Convention had
agreed upon would be questioned again.' 9
Most importantly, although debates about the adoption procedure
blended philosophic and practical considerations, ' " purely national ways
of ratification did not play a significant role in the debates. A national
referendum was not debated at all, and the motion of Governor Morris to
refer the Constitution to a national convention for ratification was not
seconded, and therefore could not even be voted on.'3' Neither a debate
nor a vote on Madison's proposal to require a majority of both the
people of the United States and the states is recorded. The debate
focused on whether state legislatures or conventions should ratify and on
the number of states in which ratification should be necessary.'32 The
Convention clearly did not have a single sovereign in mind when it
discussed the locus of constituent power.
123. See 1 RECORDS, supra note 58, at 22 (Res. 15).
124. See 2 id. at 478.
125. See2id. at563.
126. See 2 id. at 475-77 (concerning the question of unanimity; King, Morris,
Madison, Ghorum, and Pinkney used the utilitarian arguments); id. at 561-63
(concerning the motion requiring Congress's approbation; Wilson, King, and Rutlidge
emphasized the difficulties that would result from that requirement).
127. See ANDERSON, supra note 57, at 165.
128. See id.; KYvIG, supra note 59, at 49.
129. See RAKOVE, supra note 103, at 106-07.
130. See KYVIG, supra note 59, at 49.
131. See 2 RECORDS, supra note 58, at 93.
132. See 2 id. at 475-77.
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b. Congress
The Virginia Plan as Randolph proposed it on May 29, 1787, called
for a bicameral national legislature and abandoned the one-state/one-
vote principle of the Articles.' The members of the first branch were to
be elected by the people of the states and the members of the second
branch chosen by those of the first from a list of nominees drawn up by
the state legislatures. 4 The plan was referred to the Committee of the
Whole. Their amended plan was presented to the Convention on June
13, which foresaw that the members of the second branch were to be
elected by the state legislatures,'35 thereby strengthening the role of the
state governments. However, the principle of popular representation
was established for both branches, expressly repudiating the rules of the
Articles of Confederation. 136 In contrast, the New Jersey Plan proposed
amendments to the Articles without changing the structure or mode of
election of Congress, thereby preserving the basic notion of equal
representation of the states.'37 The adherence to this constitutive
principle and the differences between the two proposals are plainly
visible in the different terms used to describe the legislature: while the
New Jersey Plan speaks of the "U. States in Congress,"'3 the Virginia
Plan talks about the "national Legislature."'39 The New Jersey Plan was
rejected in the Committee of the Whole on June 19,' 40 and the Virginia
Plan then became the single basis for the debates. This was a crucial
victory for the nationalists, because it was the decision not to continue
the debate based upon a proposal embodying the essential character of
the Articles of Confederation.'4'
It was a victory in an important battle, but not victory in the war as a
whole. The development concerning representation in the second branch
of Congress illustrated this, and resulted in arguably the most important
conflict of the Convention. No agreement could be reached on the
question of whether the second branch should be based on popular
representation or if the states were to be represented equally. The
133. See l id. at 20 (Res. 2 & 3).
134. See 1 id. at 20-21 (Res. 4 & 5).
135. See 1 id. at 228 (Res. 4).
136. See 1 id. at 229-30 (Res. 7 & 9).
137. See 1 id. at 242-45.
138. 1 id. at 243.
139. 1 id. at 228.
140. See 1 id. at 313.
141. See WOOD, supra note 57, at 547.
committee that was appointed on July 2 to find a compromise'42 did not
include any of the most outspoken nationalists. 43 What became known
as the Connecticut Compromise was reported to the Convention on July
5, recommending popular representation in the first branch and equal
representation of the states in the second branch. 44 John Dickinson had
brought up this solution as early as June 6;' 4' thus, it was not a new
approach, but one that had been previously disapproved. The
nationalists continued to oppose the compromise during the ensuing
debates' 46 but on July 16, in a close five-to-four vote, the Convention
resolved the issue and adopted the compromise. 47 Thus, states' righters
won back some of the territory they had lost when the New Jersey Plan
was defeated. Though a majority favored the compromise, the delegates
were still cautious about state influence on Congress.! They tried to
alleviate it by making the national treasury responsible for the salaries of
the members of Congress instead of having the states pay them.49
From the original Virginia Plan to the final result, Congress was
changed from an institution with a pointedly national character in which
the state governments were not represented, to a legislature
incorporating equal representation of the states as well as popular
representation in which the state governments had considerable
influence. The nationalists had to accept equal representation in the
Senate, but the states' righters had to accede to popular representation in
the House. Both sides did so reluctantly, thinking either that the
Constitution would suffer from the same flaws as the Articles of
Confederation,'50 or that more state influence was necessary. 1' This
exemplifies one essential feature of the Philadelphia Convention: It was
not the place for ideological victories, but for compromise and practical
142. See 1 RECORDS, supra note 58, at 509.
143. See ANDERSON, supra note 57, at 63 (interpreting this as an indication for the
nationalists losing control of the Convention at the end); Lance Banning, The
Constitutional Convention, in THE FRAMING AND RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION
112, 121-22 (Leonard W. Levy & Dennis J. Mahoney eds., 1987).
144. See 1 RECORDS, supra note 58, at 524.
145. See I id. at 136.
146. See ANDERSON, supra note 57, at 63-67 (giving an account of the reaction of
the nationalists to the compromise).
147. See 2 RECORDS, supra note 58, at 15-16. At the vote, New York was absent
and Massachusetts divided. See 2 id.
148. See Richard A. West, Jr., We the People: Limitations on Congressional Term
Limits Are Unconstitutional Content-Determinative Regulations, 46 RUTGERS L. REV.
1787, 1829-30 (1994) (noting that the Committee report provided for payment by the
states and was changed due to concerns about state influence).
149. See id.
150. See WOOD, supra note 57, at 525-26.
151. See ANDERSON, supra note 57, at 57 (quoting opponents of popular
representation).
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solutions. In The Federalist No. 62, Madison described equal
representation in the Senate as a result of "mutual deference and
concession which the peculiarity of our political situation rendered
indispensable."'52
c. The President
According to the original version of the Virginia Plan and the
amended plan that was agreed upon in the Committee of the Whole, the
national executive was to be elected by the national legislature.' Even
the New Jersey Plan had called for a national executive to be elected by
Congress," but this was a Congress unchanged from the one established
by the Articles. It therefore was a very different form of election,
essentially based on the state governments represented in Congress.'55
Two different schools of thought existed after the rejection of the New
Jersey Plan. One was in favor of a strong national executive, elected by
an Electoral College or direct popular election; the other favored a weak
national executive elected by and responsible to Congress.'56 The idea of
direct popular election received little support.7  Apparently unable to
find a permanent majority for one of the two remaining alternatives, the
Convention changed its mind three times before a compromise was
agreed upon.'58 Election of the President should take place in the
Electoral College and the process of choosing the electors was to be
determined by the state legislatures, thereby recognizing the states.
However, it was a widely shared belief that, in most elections, no
candidate would receive a sufficient majority of votes in the Electoral
College.' 9 This made the next step all the more important in the eyes of
the delegates. The Convention decided that the next step would take
place in the House of Representatives, with each state's delegation
having one vote."O As the contingency election was expected to be
152. ThE FEDERALIST No. 62, at 377 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
153. See 1 RECORDS, supra note 58, at 21 (Res. 7), 230 (Res. 9).
154. See 1 id. at 244 (Res. 4); Shlomo Slonim, Designing the Electoral College, in
INVENTING THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY 33, 35 (Thomas E. Cronin ed., 1989).
155. See Slonim, supra note 154, at 35.
156. See KELLY ET AL., supra note 66, at 96.
157. See id.
158. See id. at 96-97.
159. See ROBERT M. HARDAWAY, THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE AND THE
CONSTrUTION: THE CASE FOR PRESERVING FEDERALISM 81 (1994).
160. See CHARLES C. THACH, JR., THE CREATION OF THE PRESIDENCY 1775-1789, at
significant, equal representation of the states in that election was an
important compromise, satisfying delegates from small states in
particular.''
The first significant aspect is the minimal support that direct popular
election received. The rejection of direct election by the people early in
the Convention and without much discussion reveals some uneasiness
toward having decisions made at a purely national level, as well as
skepticism toward direct, unfiltered democracy.'62 The other important
aspect is again the compromise between nationalists and states' righters,
between those wanting the strongest possible national executive and
those wanting a weaker one.
d. Conclusion
Neither the plan of the states' righters nor the plan of the nationalists
was made effective. The New Jersey Plan was rejected, and essential
parts of the Virginia Plan were amended. The Framers avoided explicit
textual description of the central government as "federal" or
"national."'63 The development of the different compromises and the
difficulties both sides had accepting them demonstrate clearly that none
of the theoretical concepts prevailed.'6 Nationalists as well as states'
righters argued in favor of who they thought the sovereign should be, but
no side was able to win a majority.'65 This compromise, giving
significant influence on the national government to the people of each
state and the state governments as well as to the people of the United
States, is a principal characteristic of the Constitution.
3. Ratification in the State Conventions
The understanding of those who ratified the Constitution is at least as
important as the understanding of those who drafted it, since the
legitimacy of the document is derived from the ratifying conventions.'
132-33, 137 (1969) (stating that originally, the Senate was to choose from the five
candidates who received the most votes, but because the Senate was perceived as too
strong the power to decide was given to the House).
161. See HARDAWAY, supra note 159, at 82; KELLY Er AL., supra note 66, at 97.
162. See WOOD, supra note 61, at 17-18 (noting that the belief in democracy had
been diminished since the time of independence by the experience with democracy in the
states, which was perceived by many as majoritarian tyranny).
163. Amar, supra note 57, at1455 n.125; see 1 RECORDS, supra note 58, at 335.
164. See Neil M. Richards, Note, U.S. Term Limits v. Thornton and Competing
Notions of Federalism, 12 J.L. & POL. 521, 557-58 (1997) (arguing that federalism is an
ambiguous theory reflecting a compromise).
165. This becomes evident by the aforementioned compromises.
166. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 403 ("From these
Conventions the constitution derives its whole authority.").
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The problem with this approach, however, is that it is extremely difficult
to determine the Ratifiers' precise intentions.67 This section will
identify the causes of this problem and argue that some of the causes
support the understanding of the Constitution as a compromise.
The Constitution was sent to Congress, accompanied by a letter that
George Washington had signed on behalf of the Convention; Congress
then submitted the Constitution and the letter to the state conventions for
ratification. The letter endorses the notion that the adoption of the
Constitution creates a new national sovereign and includes references to
a union already existing.'6 Although the letter is an important document,
it marks only the beginning of the ratification debates, reflecting the
views of George Washington and not of the whole Convention or the
Ratifiers.
a. Ratification Debates
The ratification debates were a struggle in which the participants'
goals dominated the arguments to a large degree. The purpose of their
statements was not to interpret the Constitution, but to advocate either its
ratification or its rejection. A number of participants who in fact
considered the Constitution to be inadequately nationalist subsequently
argued in favor of it; their public arguments differed from those that they
had used in the secrecy of the debates in the Convention. 9 They
believed that it was necessary to cater to the existing sentiments in order
to be successful in the public debate. Therefore, the Framers had
convened secretly in Philadelphia. The Framers expected not to be able
to say or write what they really thought in a public debate, and they
acted correspondingly.* Therefore, their writings published during the
debates on ratification should be treated with great caution. The
nationalists argued in favor of a document that they considered
insufficient, not because of a strong belief in the compromise that was
achieved, but because the alternative seemed even worse to them and
because they considered the compromise to be inevitable. James
167. See Jack N. Rakove, Fidelity Through History (or to It), 65 FORDHAM L. REV.
1587, 1602 (1997).
168. See Daniel A. Farber, The Constitution's Forgotten Cover Letter: An Essay on
the New Federalism and the Original Understanding, 94 MICH. L. REv. 615, 638-39
(1995).
169. See MCDONALD, supra note 70, at 276-77.
170. See WOOD, supra note 57, at 526.
Madison, who is often portrayed as the father of the Constitution, is the
best example of this. He defended the Constitution eloquently in The
Federalist Papers, but was not satisfied at all with the outcome.17' This
seriously affects the value of the writings of the supporters. Their
writings were not an interpretation of the constitutional text by
individuals who were trying to be objective, but rather represent
advocacy by persons whose goal was to "sell" the Constitution to the
public.77 The opponents of ratification, the so-called Anti-Federalists,
played a major role in shaping the Constitution; their ideas and beliefs
are reflected in the compromise that eventually evolved. Their writings,
which argue against adopting the Constitution, however, can hardly be
seen as an authoritative interpretation of the document. As a result,
neither the writings of the supporters nor those of the opponents are a
reliable source to help discover the Ratifiers' intent.
Another difficulty in the analysis of the ratification debates involves
distinguishing expectations of how the nation would be governed from
an understanding of the rules and standards in the Constitution.'73
Finally, the documentary record for the state conventions is poor and
uneven;'74 proceedings of the conventions were taken down inaccurately,
as some of the stenographers were partisans and others lacked adequate
skills.'75 The larger public discussion offers a bewildering array of
sources ranging from silly to brilliant.76 It is impossible to determine
171. See id. at 472-74 (describing the purely national constitution Madison initially
wanted). In addition, there is debate about the compatibility of Madison's later writings
with his essays in The Federalist Papers. See Douglas W. Jaenicke, Madison v.
Madison: The Party Essays v. The Federalist Papers, in REFLECTIONS ON THE
CONSTITUTION: THE AMERICAN CONSTTUTION AFTER Two HUNDRED YEARs 116, 116-47
(Richard Maidment & John Zvesper eds., 1989) (arguing that Madison's later writings
are significantly different).
172. See Richards, supra note 164, at 535-36 (pointing out the same limitations of
sources from the debates, finding the ratification-era evidence concerning his inquiry to
be ambiguous).
173. See Michael W. McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating the Founders' Design, 54
U. CHI. L. REv. 1484, 1490-91 (1987) (reviewing RAOUL BERGER, FEDERALISM: THE
FOUNDERS' DEsIGN (1987) and giving a good example of the need to make the
distinction).
174. See Rakove, supra note 167, at 1602.
175. See James H. Hutson, The Creation of the Constitution: The Integrity of the
Documentary Record, 65 TEX. L. REV. 1, 19-25 (1986) (pointing out that the
independence of the persons recording the debates is at least questionable for the
conventions in Connecticut, New York, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, and North
Carolina).
176. See BERNARD BAILYN, FACES OF REVOLUTION, PERSONALITIES AND THEMES IN
THE STRUGGLE FOR AMERICAN INDEPENDENCE 229-30 (1990); Rakove, supra note 167, at
1602; see also Richards, supra note 164, at 530 & n.38 (describing the ratification
process as having left more substantial evidence than the Constitutional Convention
concerning the particular subject of his inquiry, but acknowledging the spotty character
of the records).
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which-and how much-of these articles and speeches became part of a
shared or consensual understanding of the Ratifiers.'"
It may be possible to show a generally accepted Ratifier intent
regarding some issues. However, the balance between nation and states
was such a controversial topic that these debates can be a source of
many quotations in support of various different and contradictory views.
A coherent, general Ratifier intent does not follow from the statement,
"the Constitution was ratified on the basis of many understandings."
178
b. The Federalist Papers
As the documents from the ratification debates that are most quoted
today, The Federalist Papers warrant a closer analysis of their value for
constitutional interpretation. As described above, one initial reason for
caution when interpreting The Federalist Papers is that their goal was to
help convince a majority of the positive attributes of the Constitution.
Thus, they cannot be read solely as a faithful reflection of the
Convention's intentions.'79 In addition, The Federalist Papers had only
minimal influence on the ratification debates; their circulation was very
limited. 8 There were more influential publications and speeches, and
The Federalist Papers are read far more closely today than they were
during the debates.' However, The Federalist Papers are the prime
example of the relative futility of trying to claim that documents from
the ratification debates support only one view. The Supreme Court
Justices frequently draw different conclusions from the writings of
177. See Rakove, supra note 167, at 1602.
178. Martin Diamond, What the Framers Meant by Federalism, in A NATION OF
STATES: ESSAYS ON THE AMERICAN FEDERAL SYSTEM 24, 41 (Robert A. Goldwin ed.,
1963); see John C. Ranney, The Bases of American Federalism, 3 WM. & MARY Q. 1, 32
(1946) (pointing out the mixing and interpenetrating of motives and describing how the
importance of certain issues varied from state to state).
179. See supra notes 169-72 and accompanying text.
180. See Larry D. Kramer, Madison's Audience, 112 HARV. L. REV. 611, 665
(1998); Stephen L. Schechter, The Federalist on Federalism, in ROOTS OF THE REPUBLIC:
AMERICAN FOUNDING DocuMENTS INTERPRETED 291, 294 (Stephen L. Schechter ed.,
1990) (stating that the impact on its intended audience, the people of New York, was
negligible).
181. See BAILYN, supra note 176, at 230-31 & n.12 (noting that the comments on
The Federalist Papers at the time were few and politically unremarkable, and stating that
their importance is mainly a 20th century phenomenon); Kramer, supra note 180, at 679
(arguing that Madison did not find an audience until well into our own century); Rakove,
supra note 167, at 1597; James Etienne Viator, Introduction: The Federalist-A
Symposium, 21 TEX. TECH. L. REv. 2317,2319 (1990).
Madison, Hamilton, and Jay.' The best example is the discussion of The
Federalist No. 27 in Printz, which is interpreted differently by the
Court,"3 the main dissent,' and the separate dissent by Justice Souter.'
All three opinions go to great lengths to prove that the other
understandings are wrong, but fail to convince each other. The reason
for this disagreement is that all of them find some language to support
their view, speaking of an "unequivocal statement' '8 6 or at least
discovering "natural assumptions" on which the arguments in The
Federalist No. 27 rest.'n Similarly, scholarly debate over the proper
meaning of The Federalist Papers with respect to the constitutional
system of federalism did not provide any consensus.'" Used by
committed nationalists and enthusiastic advocates of state sovereignty as
a basis for their arguments, Publius spoke with many voices over the
years. 9 This illustrates the difficulties of interpreting The Federalist
Papers,'O even though it is the most "comprehensive and systematic"
document from the ratification debates. 9' The possibility of supporting
all these different views based on The Federalist Papers perfectly
illustrates the character of the Constitution as a compromise. As all the
different ideas are reflected in the Constitution, they are also reflected in
the writings of those who defended it.
4. Summary
Although it is agreed upon that the people are the source of
182. The justices draw very different and often opposite conclusions not only from
The Federalist Papers in its entirety, but also from the same article. For example, the
Court's interpretation of The Federalist No. 52 is conflicting in Term Limits. Compare
U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 806-07 & n.18 (1995) ('The text of
The Federalist No. 52 belies the dissent's reading."), with id. at 900-02 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting) (the opposing view of the dissent). Probably the most famous paper, The
Federalist No. 39, is quoted in support of the respective views of both sides in Garcia.
See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 550 (1985); id. at 570
(Powell, J., dissenting).
183. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 910-11 (1997).
184. See id. at 947-50 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
185. See id. at 971-72 (Souter, J., dissenting).
186. Id. at 947 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
187. Id. at911.
188. See James W. Ducayet, Publius and Federalism: On the Use and Abuse of The
Federalist in Constitutional Interpretation, 68 N.Y.U. L. REv. 821, 824 (1993).
189. See id. at 825-40 (showing the vastly different conclusions drawn from The
Federalist in three separate historical periods).
190. See Martin S. Flaherty, History "Lite" in Modem American Constitutionalism,
95 COLUM. L. REv. 523, 572-73 (1995) (providing another example of the ambiguity
discussing The Federalist No. 46); Richards, supra note 164, at 531-34 (discussing the
ambiguity of The Federalist regarding state-imposed term limits, especially of No. 39).
191. Rakove, supra note 167, at 1597.
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democratic legitimacy for government under the Constitution, it is still
greatly disputed whether this means the people of the states or the people
of the United States. The Constitution as it was ratified from 1787 to
1789 does not answer this question."n
Congress represents the people of the states, the governments of the
states, and the people of the United States. In this respect, the election
of the national executive is similar, because all of these different groups
are represented in this process, too. The development toward this result
shows that both the nationalists and the states' righters had to make
concessions regarding both processes. This result manifests in another
way in the ratification and amendment processes, which create a
constituent power that neither consists solely of the people of the United
States nor relies exclusively on the people of each state. The
development of the relevant Articles demonstrates that a purely national
as well as a purely state-based form of ratification and amendment failed
to win enough support in the Philadelphia Convention. Neither the
people of each state nor the unitary American people are the sovereign
upon whose decision the legitimacy of the Constitution is founded.
Instead, the legitimacy of the Constitution is based upon both
components acting together. The role given to the state governments
changes the result of the processes, as institutions trying to protect their
own power are integrated into the process. The basic scheme is not
altered by this since these institutions derive their democratic legitimacy
from the people of each respective state. Not a single sovereign, but
rather a cooperative sovereign, was brought into being.9 Two columns
support the Constitution itself and the national government: the people
of the individual states and the American people.
192. See H. Jefferson Powell, The Political Grammar of Early Constitutional Law,
71 N.C. L. REv. 949 passim (1993) (arguing that the Constitution in general does not
provide many specific answers or specific outcomes but does provide a framework
termed "political grammar").
193. The concept of sovereignty should be used only very carefully to describe the
states or the national government in a federal system. It developed in 16th and 17th
century Europe as a description of autonomous and absolute power embodied in a ruler
or governmental body, and no governmental body in a federal system is completely
autonomous or has absolute power. That the use of this concept to describe parts of a
federal system in the 20th century is not without problems is demonstrated by the
discussion on sovereign state autonomy. See infra Part IV.A.l.
B. The Bill of Rights
During the ratification debates, the prospect and sometimes promise of
immediate amendments had swung the balance in favor of accepting the
Constitution, most notably in Massachusetts, Virginia, and New York.
Subsequently, Congress approved twelve amendments in September
1789, and the ten amendments that became the Bill of Rights were
ratified by December 1791. Among those, the Tenth Amendment is the
most relevant in this context.
1. The Text
The term "the people" is used in the First, Second, Fourth, Ninth, and
Tenth Amendments. In the First and Fourth, this term describes a group
entitled to certain rights, and it is not possible to derive from it anything
concerning the source of democratic legitimacy. The Second
Amendment refers only to militias in the states; in this context, "the
people" is a state-centered term." The Ninth Amendment invokes the
authority of the people, but there is no explicit or implicit indication
whether the authority is located in the people of the states or the people
of the United States. In the Tenth Amendment, the powers not delegated
to Congress are given explicitly to the states or to the people, again
without explicit clarification of the relation between the two or
specification of whether this refers to the American people or the people
of the states. Nevertheless, it is possible to make some observations.
The reference to "the people" must be seen within the context of
solidifying the position of the states within the Constitution,195 which
suggests a state-oriented interpretation of the Amendment and of the
term "the people." In addition, the powers retained by the states or the
people are defined as those not prohibited to the states by the
Constitution. With regard to the people, this definition makes sense only
if "the people" are the people of the states severally. To restrict the
people of the United States as a whole to the powers not prohibited to
the states seems absurd. On the other hand, by speaking of "the states
respectively" in the plural but referring to "the people" in the singular,
the language of the Tenth Amendment supports the idea of a unitary
people." All in all, the short text of the Tenth Amendment provides
contradictory clues, but does not provide a conclusive answer.
194. See Monaghan, supra note 77, at 133 n.66.
195. See United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941) (indicating that the
Tenth Amendment may be only a truism, but even if this is so, the position of the states
is secured by explicitly stating this truism).
196. See Amar, supra note 57, at 1456.
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2. The Development of the Text
The ratifying conventions proposed amendments containing
provisions that would alter the structure of the Constitution. For
example, the Virginia convention suggested requiring a two-thirds
majority in both Houses to enact commerce regulations." New York's
convention proposed requiring an oath of all federal officers not to
infringe or violate state constitutions.'98 Under many of the proposals,
the ability of the national government to impose direct taxes would have
been rigorously diminished.'" Madison, who had committed himself to
work for a bill of rights during his election campaign in Virginia,m"
ignored most of these propositions,20' and focused on individual rights
instead.* For him, the amendments' purpose was to delineate inviolable
rights of mankind, while the Constitution's structure should be "as little
touched as possible." ' In his speech introducing the amendment
proposals in Congress, Madison made clear that his proposal was a
Federalist's document.2 As a consequence, one of the clauses in his
proposal explicitly protected some rights from infringement not only by
the national government, but also by the state governments.05 During
the debates in the House of Representatives, some of the provisions
proposed in the ratification conventions and omitted by Madison were
197. See 4 THEROOTS OFTHEBEL OFRiGHTs 843 (Bernard Schwartz ed., 1980).
198. See 4 id. at 918 (31st proposal).
199. See 4 id. at 713 (4th proposal by Massachusetts convention); 4 id. at 757 (3rd
proposal by South Carolina convention); 4 id. at 760 (4th proposal by New Hampshire
convention); 4 id. at 843 (3rd proposal by Virginia convention); 4 id. at 915, 916 (3rd
and 15th proposals by New York convention).
200. See Robert A. Rutland, Framing and Ratifying the First Ten Amendments, in
THE FRAMING AND RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 305, 308 (Leonard W. Levy &
Dennis J. Mahoney eds., 1987); see also David N. Mayer, Justice Clarence Thomas and
the Supreme Court's Rediscovery of the Tenth Amendment, 25 CAP. U. L. REv. 339, 348
(1996) (pointing out the influence of Madison's correspondence with Jefferson, who
vigorously supported a bill of rights).
201. See ANDERSON, supra note 57, at 177; KYvIG, supra note 59, at 99.
202. See Donald S. Lutz, The Pedigree of the Bill of Rights, in THE BnLL OF RIGHTS:
GOVERNMENT PROSCRIBED 42, 47-53 (Ronald Hoffman & Peter J. Albert eds., 1996)
(tracking Madison's success in shifting the discussion on both powers and rights to one
only on rights).
203. Rutland, supra note 200, at 311 (quoting Madison).
204. See Murray Dry, Federalism and the Constitution: The Founders' Design and
Contemporary Constitutional Law, 4 CONST. COMMENTARY 233, 239-40 (1987).
205. See THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE DRAFTS, DEBATES, SOURCES, AND
ORIGINS 663 (Neil H. Cogan ed., 1997) [hereinafter THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS]
(quoting part of Madison's fifth proposal).
brought forth by Anti-Federalists but rejected by the large Federalist
majority.0 6 After the House had approved seventeen amendments, the
Senate reduced the wordiness of the resolutions and dropped the
resolution prohibiting states from infringing some rights, finally
approving a package of twelve amendments.'o The only relevant change
after that concerned the establishment of religion."08 In general, Madison
and a Federalist Congress changed the amendments proposed in the
ratifying conventions to language that did not alter the structure of the
Constitution, but promoted individual rights. Some of the state
legislatures debating the ratification of the proposed amendments called
for additional amendments similar to those put forward by state
ratification conventions.20 They simply were unable to achieve their
goal of amendments that would alter the constitutional structure in favor
of the states.
The only exception hereto may be the Tenth Amendment. All of the
conventions that had attached an appeal for amendments included a
provision similar to the final Tenth Amendment. Most states wanted
Congress's powers to be restricted to those "expressly"
' 0 or "clearly"21'
delegated. The convention in New York approved language explicitly
allocating the retained power to the "People of the several States, or to
their respective State Governments. '212 Madison's proposal omitted the
term "expressly" and did not refer to the people of the states, but only to
the states severally as the locus of the retained power.1 3 Motions by
Gerry and Tucker to insert "expressly" into the text failed in the
House." 4 Gerry also motioned to refer specifically to the people of the
states by adding "and people thereof' after "States" but this proposal
206. See GEORGE ANASTAPLO, THE AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION: A
COMMENTARY 37-38 (1995); DAvID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: THE
FEDERALIST PERIOD, 1789-1801, at 112 (1997) ("Antifederalists had won only 10 of 59
seats in the House, and only Virginia sent Antifederalists to the Senate."); KYVIG, supra
note 59, at 104.
207. See EDWARD DUMBAULD, THE BILL OF RIGHTS AND WHAT IT MEANS TODAY
44-48 (1957); see also KYVIG, supra note 59, at 104.
208. See KYVIG, supra note 59, at 104-05.
209. See Kenneth R. Bowling, Overshadowed by States' Rights: Ratification of the
Federal Bill of Rights, in THE BILL OF RIGHTS: GOvERNmENT PRoscmED 85-90 (Ronald
Hoffman & Peter J. Albert eds., 1997).
210. 3 THE ROOTS OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS supra note 197, at 712 (first proposal by
Massachusetts convention). See 4 id. at 757 (second proposal by South Carolina
convention); id. at 760 (first proposal by New Hampshire convention).
211. 4 id. at 911-12 (third resolution in the declaration of the New York
convention).
212. 4 id. at 912.
213. See THE COMPLETE BILL OFRIGHTS, supra note 205, at 663 (eighth proposal).
214. See id. at 665.
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was rejected as well."5 The records are contradictory regarding the
motions in the House to add "or to the people" at the end of the
amendment. Though motions to do so by Representative Carroll and
Representative Sherman are recorded as being agreed to, the version
reported to the Senate omitted the words.1" In the Senate, another
attempt to insert "expressly" failed.21 1 With the addition of the words "or
to the people," the Senate gave the provision its final wording.
218
However, the Senate did not convene publicly and no debate about this
particular change is recorded.1 9
Lacking records of any kind, it is impossible to determine whether this
addition was a reference merely to popular sovereignty in general, or
more specifically to the American people. Nonetheless, the
development in Congress demonstrates that it is at least highly unlikely
that the last phrase refers to the people of each state because a motion
explicitly referring to them was rejected.
In sum, the final version of the Tenth Amendment changed from
explicitly recognizing the authority of the people of the several states to
a greatly diluted version of what the Anti-Federalists had in mind
originally. It used the term "the people" in the singular and did not limit
Congress to expressly granted powers. In its historic context, it
reaffirms "the centralizing tendencies of the new system." '
Nevertheless, the states as entities are recognized and the powers that
they have under the Constitution are explicitly protected. Though the
text developed into something far less state-centered than the proposals
of the ratifying conventions, one of their core demands, the explicit
protection of state power, was still met.
3. Summary
The Bill of Rights has been characterized as state-centered because it
emerged from an effort in the ratifying conventions to preserve state
215. See id.
216. See id. at 665-66.
217. See id. at 667.
218. See id. at 668-69.
219. See ANDERSON, supra note 57, at 177 (noting that the Senator whose journal
provides the best view behind the closed doors of the Senate was out sick and therefore
almost nothing is known about this particular debate in the Senate).
220. Charles A. Lofgren, The Origins of the Tenth Amendment: History,
Sovereignty, and the Problem of Constitutional Intention, in CONSTTUTIONAL
GOVERNMENT IN AMERICA 331, 349 (Ronald K. L. Collins ed., 1980).
autonomy.22' This disregards the crucial role that Madison and a
Federalist Congress played in the process trying to preserve the structure
of the Constitution. Anti-Federalists, such as Richard Henry Lee and
Patrick Henry, were extremely disappointed with the results, especially
with the lack of protection for the states. However, to declare a
Federalist victory and to interpret the Tenth Amendment as supporting
the thesis of a unitary people ignores important state-centered aspects.
There was enough pressure to overcome the Federalists' opposition to a
bill of rights;' moreover, the Tenth Amendment is an ambiguous
provision, which partly mirrors state-centered views. In the debates
concerning the ratification of the amendments, Federalists opposed them
as being too strong and Anti-Federalists considered them not strong
enough.' The Bill of Rights is as much a compromise as is the
Constitution. It reflects the efforts of the conventions to strengthen the
position of the states, as well as the Federalists' opposing point of view
that amendments were unnecessary.
C. Conclusion
Compared to the Articles of Confederation, the Constitution provided
an immense nationalization of power and of the political processes. In
the federal structure of the Constitution, three groups participate in the
democratic processes legitimizing the federal government: the people of
the states, the state governments, and the American people.
The influence given not only to the people of each state, but also to the
state governments, enables the latter to defend their interests at the
national level. The state legislatures are the institutions that stand to lose
power whenever Congress regulates an area previously regulated by the
states. Their involvement thus creates an institutionalized
counterinterest to the inherent interest of the national institutions in
increasing their own power. With the participation of that interest in the
national democratic processes and its considerable influence in mind, the
safeguard doctrine in Garcia seems feasible.226
The people of the states severally and the people of the United States
as a whole are part of the process of electing the federal government,
221. See Monaghan, supra note 77, at 133.
222. See ROBERT ALLEN RUTLAND, THE BIRTH OF THE BILL OF RiGHTs: 1776-1791,
at 213-15 (1991).
223. See Amar, supra note 57, at 1456.
224. See Rutland, supra note 200, at 309-13 (providing an account of how reluctant
the members of the House were to take on this issue).
225. See CRAIG R. SMITH, To FORM A MORE PERFEcr UNION: THE RATIFICATION OF
THE CoNsrrnoN AND THE BILL OFRIGHTS 1787-1791, at 151 (1993).
226. See supra Part I.A.2.
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which is thus supported by these two foundations together. The
Constitution created a structure in which the term "the people"
sometimes describes the people of a single state and sometimes
describes the American people. The middle ground established during
the Founding is the incorporation of two distinct political entities into
the constitutional structure and its democratic processes by giving
significant roles to both of them.
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT
The previous Part identified the three groups that participate in the
national democratic processes created by the Constitution. This Part
analyzes changes that have affected each of these groups and their roles
since the Founding. First, the constitutional amendments will be
considered, along with an analysis of their effect on the structure of the
democratic processes. Some amendments were accompanied by other
changes in the laws governing electoral processes, which had a
significant impact on the structure of these processes. These
amendments will be considered in their context and as a part of other
developments taking place at the same time. Second, some of the
amendments that were never ratified, but were close to ratification, will
be examined more closely. Rejected amendments are an important part
of constitutional development as they help to demonstrate the limits of
constitutional change.
A. Early Amendments
Only two amendments were adopted between the ratification of the
Bill of Rights and the Civil War, both of them around the turn of the
century. Each was a reaction to a specific event. The Eleventh
Amendment became the center of a debate on state sovereignty. The
Twelfth Amendment had a lasting, though mostly indirect, impact on the
structure of the democratic processes.
1. Amendment XI
The Eleventh Amendment"' overturned the Supreme Court's decision
in Chisholm v. Georgia. It is a short and very specific amendment,
227. See U.S. CONST. amend XI.
228. 2 U.S. (2 DaU.) 419 (1793).
stating that the jurisdiction of the federal courts does not include suits
against states by citizens of other states or any foreign country. The
Supreme Court ruled in Chisholm that Georgia was required to pay the
bill of a South Carolina merchant from whom war supplies were
purchased. 9  This provoked a quick response; ratification of the
Amendment was completed by February of 1795.' It has become the
center of a debate involving questions of state sovereignty. In Seminole
Tribe v. Florida,2' the majority of the Supreme Court reaffirmed Hans v.
Louisiana.m  The Court interpreted the Amendment as confirming the
presupposition "that each State is a sovereign entity in our federal
system; and... '[i]t is inherent in the nature of sovereignty not to be
amenable to the suit of an individual without [the sovereign's]
consent."'" 3 The dissent argued that this conclusion-that sovereignty
logically results in immunity-seems to be at odds with the
metamorphosis of the sovereignty concept during the Founding.! 4 The
concept of sovereignty as a single higher authority that is subject to no
law had been replaced by a concept of dual delegated sovereign powers
in the federal system, which ultimately originates in the people." 5 The
conflicting opinions show, at the very least, that invoking state
sovereignty in order to derive immunity from it, without an attempt to
define the sovereignty of a state in the existing federal system, is too
simple. The difficulty of finding such a definition can be observed in
the most recent decisions on state sovereign immunity.
In Alden v. Maine,36 the Court unsuccessfully attempted to clarify the
meaning of sovereignty, stating that the states "retain the dignity, though
not the full authority, of sovereignty."' 7 Nevertheless, however critical
one might be of the decisions, their effect must be recognized. The
Supreme Court has reaffirmed Hans for over a century now. More
importantly, the decisions at the end of the last term have substantially
hampered the enforcement of federal laws against the states because
citizens can no longer sue for a violation of federal law.2s Therefore, in
effect, a stronghold of state immunity was created.
229. See id. at 479.
230. See KYviG, supra note 59, at 112-14 (stating that the process of notifying
federal officials was considerably slower and that the addition of the amendment was not
announced by President John Adams until January 1798, but it was quickly and
overwhelmingly ratified by all states).
231. 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
232. 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
233. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 54 (quoting Hans, 134 U.S. at 13).
234. See id. at 149-50 (Souter, J., dissenting).
235. See id. at 150-51 (Souter, J., dissenting).
236. 119 S. Ct. 2240 (1999).
237. Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2247.
238. See, e.g., id. at 2246.
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Despite its considerable impact, however, the sovereign immunity
jurisprudence leaves the structure of democratic processes within
federalism intact. Some potentially might argue that if there is
presupposed state sovereign immunity, the entity that possesses such
sovereignty must be the locus of constituent power. But, based on the
premise that the Court's wide understanding of state sovereignty is
correct, it is still a concept limited to the question: Can the states be sued
on the basis of federal law? Although the sovereignty as understood by
the Court is "inviolable," 9 it is also "residuary."'  One, therefore,
cannot argue that whoever possessed this sovereignty at the time of the
Founding necessarily possessed the constituent power as well, since this
sovereignty is not a complete sovereignty.
2. Amendment XII
The Twelfth Amendment, ratified in 1804, concerns the process of
electing the President. The amendment was designed to prevent the
events of the 1800 election from recurring: a tie in the Electoral College
between Thomas Jefferson and Aaron Burr and a weeklong deadlock in
the House."4 Providing for distinct ballots for President and Vice
President was its most important change. It also contains a sophisticated
description of the procedure when no candidate achieves a sufficient
majority in the Electoral College. The language of the amendment is
very similar to the language of the provisions in Article II, Section 1 that
are superseded. The events in the presidential elections of 1796 and
1800, which led to the amendment and the changes in the political
system of which the amendment was one part, are examined below.
a. Background
Article II, Section 1, Clause 3 of the Constitution gave each elector
two votes without distinguishing between votes for President and Vice
President. The runner-up, the newly elected President's most successful
opponent, became Vice President. Although no formal party machinery
existed, the 1796 election was de facto a contest between the Federalists
and the Republicans, who had emerged as the opponent of the
239. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 86.
240. Id. at 141 (Souter, J., dissenting).
241. See KYVIG, supra note 59, at 114-15.
Federalists. Each group had a candidate for President and Vice
President but the result was Federalist John Adams becoming President
and the Republican Jefferson being elected Vice President.2 42  Party
discipline in support of a ticket was not yet strictly enforced because no
developed nominating procedure existed. 43 In 1800, a bitterly contested
election featured two organized political parties,' which had chosen
their nominees for President and Vice President in congressional
caucuses.24 5 The Republicans wanted to avoid the outcome of 1796, an
administration headed by the leaders of two hostile political
organizations; all of their electors voted for Jefferson and Burr, the latter
being the candidate for Vice President.2 6 This time, the result was a tie
between the two members of the same party; the House had to resolve
the tie. In the House, the Federalists had enough votes to block a
majority for Jefferson; several Federalists decided to vote for Burr,
whom they considered the lesser evil?4 7 Only on the thirty-sixth ballot,
and after six days of debates and backroom discussions, was Jefferson
elected President on February 17.248 The members of the Constitutional
Convention had not foreseen the rise of political parties and their
domination of the presidential elections.29 National party organizations
enabled the ticket of a party to undoubtedly win an election and achieve
a majority in the Electoral College. The method of voting in the college
made it difficult to convert this majority into the election of both party
candidates. If some electors of a party did not vote for their vice-
presidential candidate, the presidential candidate of the opposing party
could be elected Vice President in order to avoid a tie between their
presidential and vice-presidential candidates. Furthermore, the
proceedings gave the minority a chance to prevent the presidential
242. See HARDAWAY, supra note 159, at 91; Charles C. Euchner & John Anthony
Maltese, The Electoral Process, in SELECTING THE PRESIDENT: FROM 1789 TO 1996, at 1,
7 (1997); Merrill D. Peterson, Constitutional History, 1789-1801, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 387, 390 (Leonard W. Levy et al. eds., 1986).
243. See SIDNEY M. MILKIs & MICHAEL NELSON, THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY:
ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT, 1776-1993, at 98-99 (1994).
244. See Charles C. Euchner, Chronology of Presidential Elections, in SELECTING
THE PRESIDENT: FROM 1789 TO 1996, at 149, 152 (1997); Peterson, supra note 242, at
391.
245. See MiLKis & NELSON, supra note 243, at 99.
246. See TADAHISA KURODA, THE ORIGINS OF THE TWELFTH AMENDMENT: THE
ELECTORAL COLLEGE IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC, 1787-1804, at 99 (1994).
247. See MILKIS & NELSON, supra note 243, at 99; Euchner & Maltese, supra note
242, at 7-8.
248. See KURODA, supra note 246, at 102-05 (giving an account of what happened
in the House).
249. See MILKIs & NELSON, supra note 243, at 107; THACH, supra note 160, at 133;
Dennis J. Mahoney, Twelfth Amendment, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERICAN
CONSTrrTUON 1927, 1927 (Leonard W. Levy et al. eds., 1986).
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candidate of the winning party from being elected by voting for the
winning party's vice-presidential candidate, either in the Electoral
College or, as the Federalists had done, in the House. In a nutshell, once
the national process had produced a majority, the minority had a chance
to counteract this result. This prompted the Republicans to seek
amendment.
b. The Amendment
During the Eighth Congress, the basic feature of the Twelfth
Amendment, separate ballots, was agreed upon in both chambers. The
House and the Senate disagreed only with respect to minor issues, such
as the number of candidates the House should be able to choose from if
there was no sufficient majority in the Electoral College, and what
should happen if the House failed to elect a President.' 0 Federalists saw
the proposed amendment as an assault on state equality, increasing the
influence of the large states, and thereby destroying the federal
principle."1 The reason for this was that tie votes in the Electoral
College, and with that the referral of the election to the House, were now
seen as highly unlikely. This would reduce the influence of the small
states since they had equal voting power in the House, but not in the
Electoral College."2 In the opinion of the Federalists, it would direct the
United States toward a consolidated republic.23 However, they failed to
block the proposed amendment in Congress.2 A presidential election
has been referred to the House only once since then, in the 1825 election
of John Quincy Adams.' The fact that the referral to the House became
so rare effectively did away with one important part of the compromise
concerning presidential elections in the Constitutional Convention. The
250. See KURODA, supra note 246, at 117-52 (describing the discussions in
Congress).
251. See id. at 140-41 (quoting Senator Uriah Tracy, whose speech summed up the
position of the Federalist minority).
252. See NEAL R. PEIRCE, THE PEOPLE'S PRESIDENT: THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE IN
AMERICAN HISTORY AND THE DIRECT-VOTE ALTERNATIvE 73 (1968) (quoting Senator
William Plummer).
253. See KURODA, supra note 246, at 141.
254. See PEIRCE, supra note 252, at 73-74 (voting in the Congress was cast almost
exclusively along party lines).
255. See HARDAWAY, supra note 159, at 55. The problem in the 1825 election was
not the lack of a majority in the Electoral College but contested popular vote returns.
Congress had to decide the validity of these returns and therefore this was an exceptional
situation, not a referral to the House for the reasons the Framers had anticipated. See id.
compromise was accepted because the delegates expected the House to
decide in a relevant number of elections, thereby giving the equal
representation of the states in this procedure actual and not just
theoretical significance. Furthermore, the Twelfth Amendment
invigorated the development of national political parties, 6 thereby
nationalizing the presidency profoundly.
c. Developments in the Political System
Amending the Constitution was only one part of the changes in the
political system in the early nineteenth century. It arguably did no more
than give constitutional recognition to changes in the political culture
manifested by the emergence of political parties at a national level. The
parties aggregated national support for their candidates and recruited
electors pledged to them, changing the role of the elector from a person
free to vote for whomever seemed most competent to a person devoted
to a particular party. 7  Another important change was the loss of
influence that the state legislatures suffered, although this was self-
inflicted. The Constitution confers plenary power upon the legislature of
each state to choose the method of appointment for electors? 8 under the
condition that the Equal Protection Clause is not violated.29 In the first
few presidential elections, most state legislatures chose electors
themselves, while only a few used intermediate methods involving the
electorate and the legislature7m The popularization of democratic ideals
and negative experience with legislative politics created an uneven but
inevitable movement toward popular selection of electors. 261 By 1820,
merely nine states did not provide for popular election of presidential
electors; by 1832, only North Carolina's electors were not popularly
elected.262 Though this mode of election was not required by the
Constitution, it had an impact on the process of electing the President as
the influence of the state governments was de facto eliminated. In
addition, another development strengthened the role of the people of a
state as distinct political units: Since the 1830s, the states almost
256. See KYvIG, supra note 59, at 116-17.
257. See LAWRENCE D. LONGLEY & ALAN G. BRAUN, THE POLITICS OF ELECTORAL
COLLEGE REFORM 28 (1972); LAWRENCE D. LONGLEY & NEAL R. PEIRCE, THE
ELECTORAL COLLEGE PRIMER 22 (1996); John D. Feerick, The Electoral College-Why It
Ought to Be Abolished, 37 FORDHAM L. REv. 1, 11 (1969).
258. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1, cl. 2; Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 28-29
(1968); McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 35-36 (1892).
259. See Williams, 393 U.S. at 29-32.
260. See HARDAWAY, supra note 159, at 45; PEIRCE, supra note 252, at 74-77.
261. See LONGLEY & PEIRCE, supra note 257, at 24.
262. See HARDAWAY, supra note 159, at 46 (noting that since 1865, all states
provided for direct election of their electors).
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exclusively used a winner-takes-all method for choosing their electors, a
method that gives all the electors of a state to the candidate with the
most votes'. Therefore, the votes of a state are not split between
different candidates, but every state speaks with one voice in the
Electoral College.
d. Conclusion
As a result of the changes in the political system and of the Twelfth
Amendment's ratification, one part of the national political process, the
election of the President, has changed fundamentally. The results were
twofold. First, the process was nationalized by the emergence of parties
operating on a national level, organizing campaigns in all the states.6
Keeping in mind the constitutional provisions that remained intact, most
importantly the fact that electors are still appointed in each state, the
change was a gradual one. The people of each state still vote separately.
There is no proportional representation in the Electoral College, and the
winner-takes-all method ensures that states remain relevant as distinct
political units in the process of electing the President. In contrast, the
influence of the state governments was eliminated as the legislatures
provided for direct elections to appoint the electors. As a result, the
institutions that lose power when the national government attempts to
expand its sphere of competence cannot directly use the process of
electing the President to prevent their own loss of power. This does not
mean that they cannot use the process in an indirect way by appealing to
those inside it, for example by supporting certain presidential candidates.
This, however, is not a position that can be relied upon. Therefore, the
ability of state governments to influence the national government in
order to protect their own powers decreased significantly, making the
safeguard doctrine less persuasive.
263. See LONGLEY & PEIRCE, supra note 257, at 99. Maine, since 1969, and
Nebraska, since 1992, are the only states currently with a different system, though
neither has produced a division of electoral votes so far. See id.
264. Early 19th century parties did not fully congeal as national agencies until 1840,
and 19th century democracy "stretched from exclusive provincialism to inclusive
nationalism." ROBERT H. WIEBE, SELF-RULE, A CULTURAL HISTORY OF AMERICAN
DEMOCRACY 72 (1995).
B. Reconstruction Amendments
The Thirteenth Amendment was ratified in 1865, more than sixty
years after the Twelfth Amendment. The Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments followed in 1868 and 1870. They are arguably the most
important amendments to the Constitution, especially as they provided
the basis for many landmark Supreme Court cases during the twentieth
century. However, their impact on the structure of the democratic
processes, regarding the balance between the participants with whom
this Article is concerned, is slim. On the face of it, however, the national
institutions' increase in power might suggest otherwise. The Fourteenth
and Fifteenth Amendments asserted the civil rights of the former slaves,
at least on paper, including the right to vote. Congress was given the
power to enforce all three amendments. The Due Process and Equal
Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment embody one of the
most important aspects of Supreme Court jurisprudence. In addition to
changes in the constitutional text, changes in the interpretation of the
Constitution broadened national powers considerably. A specific
authorization of the national government was no longer necessary, and
implied powers became an accepted basis for national action.m In
general, the powers of national institutions grew considerably during the
Reconstruction, tilting the scale heavily in favor of the central
government. But the decision-making process at the national level and
the influence that the people of a state or the state governments had in
that process did not change. That national institutions gained
considerable influence over democratic processes in the states by
establishing rules concerning the right to vote,2 and by subjecting
legislative apportionment in the states to federal judicial review' does
not change this result. The existence of the people of a state as a distinct
political unit and their ability to make themselves heard on the national
level were the same as before the Reconstruction Amendments. What
changed was the composition of the people of a state and, through this,
the outcome of the political process in the state. But it is important to
stress that the influence that the outcome at the state level can exert in
the national democratic process was not altered. The means that the
people of a state have to participate on the national level did not change.
Citizens of a given state had as much influence on the national
government or on the process of amending the Constitution as before.
Although the positions of the confederate states on slavery and secession
265. See KYVIG, supra note 59, at 154.
266. For example, the Voting Rights Act of 1965 was based on Section 2 of the
Fifteenth Amendment. See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301,308 (1966).
267. This process was established in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 199 (1962).
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were defeated, the way the Constitution defined the roles of the people
of a state, of state governments, or the American people in the national
political processes remained unchanged. While the Civil War and
Reconstruction took the United States a long way with regard to the
acceptance of the role of the states within the federal system, the
structure of the democratic processes remained the same.
C. Early Twentieth Century Amendments
No more amendments were ratified in the nineteenth century. This
long period of unsuccessful attempts to amend the Constitution, and the
fact that the only amendments since 1804 resulted from the Civil War
and Reconstruction, led to growing criticism of Article V. Many
scholars purported an amendment to be impossible in normal
circumstances.m The successful proposals at the beginning of the
twentieth century alleviated this criticism. In the twenty years from
1913 to 1933 six amendments were ratified. The Sixteenth Amendment,
allowing Congress to collect taxes on income, further nationalized
powers, and enabled the federal government to widen its range of
activities substantially.29 Once again, this amendment had no influence
on the structure of the democratic processes. In the context of this
Article, the Seventeenth Amendment is the most important amendment
ratified in the early twentieth century.
1. The Development of Amendment XVII
The Seventeenth Amendment, ratified in 1913, changed the method
for electing Senators from election by state legislature to direct election
by the people of the respective states."7 The first proposal to provide for
popular election of senators instead of election by the state legislatures
was made as early as 1826;2"1 by the 1890s, the movement supporting
this proposal had gained strength.f 2 Criticism of the then-existing
procedure for electing senators was based on the general perception of
state legislatures as being corrupt and unable to agree on a senator. This
268. See KYVIG, supra note 59, at 191-92.
269. See U.S. CONST. amend. XVI.
270. See U.S. CONST. amend. XVII.
271. See KYVIG, supra note 59, at 208.
272. See Jay S. Bybee, Ulysses at the Mast: Democracy, Federalism, and the
Sirens' Song of the Seventeenth Amendment, 91 NW. U. L. REv. 500, 536-37 (1997).
would result in Senate seats being vacant for up to four years and even
the complete lack of Senate representation for a state for a period of two
years.273 In addition, a broad movement toward more direct popular
control and participatory democracy existed at the beginning of the
twentieth century.27' This justified amending the Constitution instead of
solving the problems of corruption and legislative deadlock with less
drastic reform measures. 275 It seems that all of these issues were far
more important than the effect that this would have on the structure of
the democratic process. This is due to the fact that the possible impact
of the Seventeenth Amendment on federalism was never an issue
throughout the debates; even most of its opponents did not expect any
centralizing effects.2 6
Since 1893, the House had repeatedly endorsed an amendment
resolution providing for direct election of Senators; however, all of these
proposals either died in a Senate committee or were never voted, on by
the Senators.2 7' Frustration over the conflict between the Senate and the
House led one Representative to introduce a resolution for the abolition
of the Senate.27 By 1911, over half of the states had a system in place
under which the state legislature elected the candidate winning a
primary, thereby approximating direct election. 279 Because of this, the
number of Senators popularly chosen, and therefore inclined to establish
direct election, rapidly grew.n0 In 1911, the House adopted a resolution
not only providing for direct election of Senators but also eliminating
federal control of senatorial elections2 l The Senate insisted on some
degree of federal control and the House agreed after almost a year of
deadlock. 2 This defeat of an attempt to achieve more state control over
273. See Vikram David Amar, Indirect Effects of Direct Election: A Structural
Examination of the Seventeenth Amendment, 49 VAND. L. REV. 1347, 1353 (1996);
Bybee, supra note 272, at 538-43; Laura E. Little, An Excursion into the Uncharted
Waters of the Seventeenth Amendment, 64 TEMP. L. REv. 629, 639 (1991).
274. See C.H. HOEBEKE, THE RoAD TO MASS DEMOCRACY: ORIGINAL INTENT AND
THE SEVENTEENTH AMENDMENT 84-89 (1995); Amar, supra note 273, at 1354; Roger G.
Brooks, Comment, Garcia, the Seventeenth Amendment, and the Role of the Supreme
Court in Defending Federalism, 10 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 189, 202 (1987).
275. See Bybee, supra note 272, at 544; Todd J. Zywicki, Senators and Special
Interests: A Public Choice Analysis of the Seventeenth Amendment, 73 OR. L. REv. 1007,
1025 (1994).
276. See Brooks, supra note 274, at 199-200,205.
277. See KYVIG, supra note 59, at 209.
278. See JOHN R. VILE, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS,
PROPOSED AMENDMENTS, AND AMENDING IssuEs 273 (1996).
279. See KYvlG, supra note 59, at 210; Ronald D. Rotunda, The Aftermath of
Thornton, 13 CONST. COmENTARY 201,207 (1996).
280. See KYVIG, supra note 59, at 210-11; VILE, supra note 278, at 272.
281. See KYviG, supra note 59, at 213.
282. See id.
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elections manifested the elimination of state government influence on
the national political processes. Ratification proceeded quickly, and
after less than eleven months the necessary number of states had
approved the Amendment.'
2. The Consequences of Amendment XVII
Defenders of state sovereignty in the Constitutional Convention
believed legislative election of Senators to be more important as a
safeguard for federalism than equal representation of the states in the
Senate.2" After the Convention accepted legislative election, nationalists
and states' righters alike believed that the states were receiving a
powerful tool."' The Seventeenth Amendment effectively repealed what
in Philadelphia had been considered a potent procedural remedy for
federal encroachment into the states' sphere. In Garcia, however, the
majority did not view this change as substantial enough to alter
fundamentally the influence of the states in the national political
processes.2s Even those on the Court opposed to the safeguard doctrine
mentioned the Seventeenth Amendment only in passing, if at all.' The
reason for neglecting the importance of the Seventeenth Amendment is
the failure to distinguish between the people of a state and the
government of a state. This corresponds with the lack of differentiation
between the interests of a state in general and the desire to protect the
powers of a state government.m For example, it is in a state's general
283. See id.
284. See Brooks, supra note 274, at 193.
285. See id.
286. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 554 (1985); see
also JESSE H. CHOPER, JuDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESs: A
FUNCTIONAL RECONSIDERATION OF THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT 176 (1980); Lewis
B. Kaden, Politics, Money, and State Sovereignty: The Judicial Role, 79 COLuM. L. REv.
847, 858-59 (1979); Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The
Role of the States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54
COLUM. L. REv. 543, 547-48 (1954). Wechsler does not even mention the Seventeenth
Amendment in the section which describes the Senate's role in safeguarding federalism,
and Choper and Kaden mention it only in passing.
287. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 578 (1995) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring); Garcia, 469 U.S. at 565 n.9 (Powell, J., dissenting); id. at 584 (O'Connor,
J., dissenting).
288. Cf. Martha A. Field, Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority:
The Demise of a Misguided Doctrine, 99 HARv. L. REV. 84, 110 (1985); Larry Kramer,
Understanding Federalism, 47 VAND. L. REv. 1485, 1510 (1994). Both authors argue
that the safeguard doctrine does not take into account the specific interests of states as
interest to acquire federal funds for local projects or to ensure that
specific local needs are considered during the making of federal laws.
Arguably, the political processes have been successful in providing these
interests with considerable influence. A senator's ability to obtain
federal funds for her state or to avoid regulation detrimental to a sector
of the economy important in that state is of utmost importance for that
senator's reelection. The Court in Garcia points to the substantial
proportion of federal revenue directed into the states' treasuries in
various ways as evidence of the influence of state interests.79 However,
the protection of the powers of state governments is different from these
general interests. The only organizations or institutions that are
permanently interested in preserving these powers are the state
governments themselves because they are the institutions in danger of
losing power. Local and national special interest groups are concerned
with their specific issues or sets of issues and do not care too much
whether it is the federal or the state government that is responsible.
The abstract interest of preserving the powers of government at the
state level is no longer represented in the national political process.
Although the senators still represent the states, they now represent only
the people of the states. The Seventeenth Amendment therefore
eliminates the permanent institutional instinct of self-preservation of
state governments from the national democratic process.
D. Mid to Late Twentieth Century Amendments
A period of important constitutional developments without formal
changes to the Constitution followed the amendments ratified early in
the twentieth century. The New Deal period resulted in the widespread
public, and subsequently judicial, acceptance of a new notion of what
was expected from government. National powers grew significantly
after the Supreme Court gave up on the narrow interpretation of the
Commerce Clause. g9  However, the structure of the democratic
processes was not altered.
From 1951 to 1997, another seven amendments were ratified. Two
amendments, the Twenty-Second and the Twenty-Fifth, again deal with
technicalities regarding the presidency. Participation of the citizens of
the District of Columbia in presidential elections was made possible by
the Twenty-Third Amendment. Amendments XXIV and XXVI enlarged
the electorate by outlawing any connection between paying taxes and the
states, as opposed to regional or local interests in general.
289. See Garcia, 469 U.S. at 552-53.
290. See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 30 (1937).
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right to vote, used by some southern states to discriminate against some
of their citizens, and by lowering the voting age from twenty-one to
eighteen. Congress adopted the Twenty-Seventh Amendment, which
denies Congress the authority to raise its own salary, in 1789 with the
first ten amendments, and it was finally ratified by the required number
of states in 1992. All of these amendments are best characterized as
refining rather than restructuring the Constitution,29 and thus offer no
substance for further examination.
E. Proposed Amendments
This section briefly examines proposed amendments that came close
to ratification or at least approval in Congress, but ultimately failed. The
purpose is to show which parts of the Constitution that structure
democratic processes have come under intensive scrutiny, but ultimately
have been considered worth keeping. In other words, proposals that
have failed indicate the limits of change so far. Two movements that
have tried to achieve amendments will be used as examples for these
limits, concerning further nationalization as well as the strengthening of
the states.
1. Direct Presidential Election
"No amendment effort has been more consistent than that for reform
of the electoral college" throughout the history of the Constitution.2'
Although changes have occurred, they were gradual, leaving the basic
system intact. More radical changes have been discussed since the
beginning of the nineteenth century, direct popular election of the
President being the most popular one.293 In the 1960s, an amendment
providing for the direct election of the President and a runoff election if
no candidate received forty percent of the total vote gained widespread
popularity. The Chamber of Commerce and the American Bar
Association supported it,2 and polls indicated that more than eighty
percent of the public along with the state legislators favored such an
amendment. In 1969, a 338 to 70 vote in the House approved it, but
291. See KYVIG, supra note 59, at 350.
292. VILE, supra note 278, at 109.
293. See id at 112.
294. See id.
295. See LONGLEY & BRAUN, supra note 257, at 156 (citing a Gallup po11 taken in
resistance in the Senate proved insurmountable.2 6 Opponents focused
their attention on what they perceived to be negative effects on the
function of democratic processes within federalism and noted that thirty-
four states would lose voting power under the proposed amendment."
Senators from southern states opposed abolishing the Electoral College
because they saw it as "an important bulwark of states' rights" and
feared that the state element of the presidency would be lost without it.293
Senators of small states were convinced that direct vote would leave
their states helpless against large states, and there was a general fear of
opening the door for amendments challenging other institutions that
recognized states as distinct entities.2' In the following years, the
amendment was reintroduced with slight modifications, such as
congressional choice instead of a runoff election; nevertheless, support
dwindled.3°° Although supporters of direct election never got as close to
success as at the end of the 1960s, the issue did not disappear. In 1979,
a popular election amendment had the support of President Jimmy
Carter but was soundly defeated in Congress.3 1  The independent
candidacy of Ross Perot in the 1992 presidential race resulted in a
number of reform proposals as House selection of the President became
a realistic possibility, though none of them came as close to being
successful as the proposal at the end of the 1960s.'
There are obviously limits to the degree of nationalization acceptable
to a majority large enough to alter the Constitution. The concept of a
President elected on a purely national basis so far has been beyond such
a limit. A willingness to eliminate the role of state governments from
the democratic processes is not followed by a willingness to do away
with the influence of the people of a state as a distinct entity. In
1968).
296. See id. at 152-74 (giving a detailed account of the events, including a
description of the organizations and individual legislators involved); KYVIG, supra note
59, at 389-91.
297. See KYVIG, supra note 59, at 390. The negative impact of reform on
federalism also has a prominent place in scholarly literature arguing for the preservation
of the Electoral College. See JuDITH BEST, THE CASE AGAINST DIREcr ELECTION OF THE
PRESIDENT: A DEFENSE OF THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE 213-14 (1975); see also
HARDAWAY, supra note 159, at 141-62 (not only focusing on direct election but also
discussing a variety of reform proposals).
298. LONGLEY & BRAuN, supra note 257, at 166.
299. See id.
300. See KYVo, supra note 59, at 391-93; LONGLEY & BRAUN, supra note 257, at
173-74.
301. See Slonim, supra note 154, at 33.
302. See Victor Williams & Alison M. MacDonald, Rethinking Article II, Section 1
and Its Twelfth Amendment Restatement: Challenging Our Nation's Malapportioned,
Undemocratic Presidential Election Systems, 77 MARQ. L. REv. 201, 257-63 (1994)
(describing the proposals made in the House and the Senate in 1992 and 1993).
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addition, the defeat of the amendment in the Senate and the reasons for
the rejection show that state interests are still powerful at the national
level. It is, however, important to note that these are the interests of the
people of a state, whose role in the selection of the national executive
has been preserved, not the interests of the state government.
2. States' Rights Amendments
In 1963, three so-called states' rights amendments received
considerable support in the aftermath of the Supreme Court decision in
Baker v. Carr,303 in which the Supreme Court declared that state
legislative apportionment is subject to federal judicial review. 04 These
proposals originated from the Council of State Governments and
affiliated organizations late in 196205 The first and most important
proposal would have changed the amendment process of Article V. The
option of calling a national convention was to be abolished; if two-thirds
of the state legislatures submitted an identical amendment, Congress
should have merely certified this and the amendment would have been
deemed proposed for ratification. As a result, the Constitution could
have been amended without the participation of any national forum;
neither Congress nor a national convention would have deliberated the
issue. The amendment process thereby would have been placed entirely
into the hands of state legislatures. 7 This would have dramatically
shifted the locus of constituent power by marginalizing national
institutions and placing the power almost entirely in the hands of state
institutions. The second proposal would have withdrawn federal
jurisdiction over apportionment, and the third proposal would have
established a Court of the Union to review Supreme Court decisions
relating to the rights reserved to the states or the people.0 ' Proponents of
303. 369 U.S. 186 (1961).
304. See id. at 237.
305. See Paul Oberst, The Genesis of the Three States-Rights Amendments of 1963,
39 NOTRE DAmB LAW. 644, 648-52 (1964).
306. See Frank E. Shanahan, Jr., Proposed Constitutional Amendments: They Will
Strengthen Federal-State Relations, 49 A.B.A. J. 631, 634 (1963) (providing the
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the amendments called upon state legislatures to seek a national
convention. Though they received considerable support, the number of
legislatures endorsing the amendments fell well short of the necessary
two-thirds?3 " The proposals provoked harsh reactions; opponents called
them an attempt to convert the United States into a confederation!"
Under the impression of this hostile reaction, state legislatures rejected
the proposals, and they received little support when introduced in the
Senate and the House. 3 1 In the end, even the National Legislative
Conference backed away from the amendments.
This attempt to amend the Constitution demonstrates the limits at the
other end of the spectrum. As much as there has been an unwillingness
to eliminate the people of a state completely from the national
democratic processes, there has also been an equivalent reluctance to
erase the national institutions from those processes.
V. CONCLUSION
The Constitution came to life as a compromise that included the
people of the states, the state governments, and the American people.
All of them were given considerable influence on the national
democratic processes, within a carefully balanced system. This federal
system cannot simply be declared to have been based ultimately on a
single group. The Constitution itself and the national democratic
processes established in the document derive democratic legitimacy
from two sources: the American people and the people of the states.
This inclusive compromise has largely survived.
Two conclusions can be drawn from the development of the
Constitution. First, the state governments have been excluded from the
national democratic processes. This eliminates an important interest
from the equation: the interest of the state governments to preserve their
powers. In addition, developments other than constitutional change
made an impact. Obviously, changes in society and the availability of
technology-in this context, especially the development of national
mass media-have had an impact on the way the democratic processes
309. See KYVIG, supra note 59, at 372.
310. See Charles L. Black, Jr., Proposed Constitutional Amendments: They Would
Return Us to Confederacy, 49 A.B.A. J. 637, 637 (1963). The Court of the Union
proposal caused the angriest comments. See Philip B. Kurland, The Court of the Union
or Julius Caesar Revised, 39 NoTRE DAME LAw. 636, 637 (calling the proposal
"absurd[]" and suggesting that seemingly only "those close to the lunatic fringe" were
prepared to support that plan); see also Oberst, supra note 305, passim (describing the
proposals in a generally pejorative way).
311. See KYVIG, supra note 59, at 373.
312. See id. at 373-74.
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function. The formation of interest groups at a national level and the
influence they have on a member of Congress or on the President may
reduce the importance of debates at the state level. How much these
changes matter is not only a complex question, but also one that goes
beyond analyzing the constitutional structure. Nevertheless, with the
only institutional actor permanently interested in the protection of the
powers of state governments excluded from the national democratic
process, the safeguard doctrine can hardly be upheld. That some state
interests are represented on the national level is not sufficient.
The second conclusion is that the part of the compromise made in the
Constitutional Convention that created a structure supported by two
columns-the people of the states and the people of the United States-
is still in place, despite continuous efforts to change some of the
provisions in which that compromise is embodied. While the state
governments lost their access to the national democratic process, the
people of the states as distinct political units continue to be an integral
part of the structure of national democratic processes. Electing the
President still follows most of the rules established in Philadelphia.
Altered only to a limited degree by the Twelfth Amendment, the
Electoral College is still there, including the mixture of equal
representation of the people of each state and popular representation that
is its characteristic feature. Congress is still a bicameral legislature with
one chamber representing the people of the states as distinct and equal
political units and the other chamber based upon popular representation.
The amendment process of Article V was not changed at all, leaving the
constituent power where the Framers put it: in the joined hands of the
American people as a whole and the people of the states as separate
entities. Ultimately, then, the dual foundation of the national institutions
is still a meaningful part of the structure of the Constitution. The middle
ground established during 1787 to 1789 has not been abandoned.
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